Return Within the Bounds of The Pinheiro Principles: The Colombian Land Restitution Experience by Attanasio, David L. & Sánchez, Nelson Camilo
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 
Volume 11 Issue 1 
January 2012 
Return Within the Bounds of The Pinheiro Principles: The 
Colombian Land Restitution Experience 
David L. Attanasio 
Harvard Law School 
Nelson Camilo Sánchez 
DeJuSticia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David L. Attanasio and Nelson Camilo Sánchez, Return Within the Bounds of The Pinheiro Principles: The 
Colombian Land Restitution Experience, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1 (2012), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Global Studies Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review 
 
VOLUME 11 NUMBER 1 2012  
 
RETURN WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE 
PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES: THE COLOMBIAN 
LAND RESTITUTION EXPERIENCE 
DAVID L. ATTANASIO 
NELSON CAMILO SÁNCHEZ  
ABSTRACT 
In this Article, we argue that a successful program for land restitution 
and return for victims of forced displacement that obeys the Pinheiro 
Principles must take a comprehensive approach, or one that provides 
support programs for returning victims through centralized 
administration. We find that a minimalist restitution program, or one that 
simply provides a legal mechanism for obtaining restitution, is much less 
likely to succeed. In evaluating the likelihood of success, we consider 
whether the program will (1) adequately preserve victim choice while 
motivating victims to return, (2) provide for the fair and adequate 
administration of both restitution and return, and (3) enable returning 
victims to have more secure land tenure than when they were expelled. 
Along each of these dimensions of concern to returning victims, we 
conclude that, to be successful, a policy must provide for centralized 
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administration of all phases of restitution and return, including extensive 
victim support. 
Our evaluation of how public policy should implement the Pinheiro 
Principles is based on an analysis of the Victim’s Law in Colombia in 
which we examine its approach to land restitution for victims of the 
Colombian armed conflict. Our analysis is grounded in the political, legal, 
and social background to land restitution in Colombia. The armed conflict 
in Colombia has lasted for over forty years and has left between three to 
five million displaced persons. Conditions in Colombia present both 
challenges and advantages for successful land restitution: challenges 
because displacement is still taking place in Colombia and advantages 
because the Constitutional Court has been a strong advocate for victims’ 
rights.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Rural citizens of Colombia have suffered repeated waves of internal 
displacement during the violence endemic to the country for the past sixty 
to seventy years, resulting in mass dispossession of property.
1
 Significant 
displacement first occurred during La Violencia, a period of near civil war 
between the primary political parties that began around 1948 and lasted 
until the late 1950s or early 1960s. The displacement rates then tapered off 
until the mid-1980s,
2
 when they began to increase again under pressure 
from guerrilla and paramilitary groups. These groups used various 
mechanisms, such as pure coercion and the illegal use of state institutions, 
to facilitate dispossession of property, primarily rural land.
3
 The 
dispossession and displacement pose a major challenge to resolving the 
conflict in Colombia; as of 2010, there were between 3.4
4
 and 5.2
5
 million 
 
 
 1. See CÉSAR RODRÍGUEZ GARAVITO & DIANA RODRÍGUEZ FRANCO, CORTES Y CAMBIO 
SOCIAL: CÓMO LA CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL TRANSFORMÓ EL DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO EN 
COLOMBIA 67–68 (2010); Ana María Ibáñez & Juan Carlos Muñoz, The Persistence of Land 
Concentration in Colombia: What Happened Between 2000 and 2009?, in DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN 
TRANSITIONS 279, 287–93 (Morten Bergsmo et al. eds., 2010), available at http://www.fichl.org/ 
fileadmin/fichl/documents/FICHL_6_web.pdf. 
 2. See RODRÍGUEZ & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 1, at 67–68; Ibáñez & Muñoz, supra note 1, at 5–
9 (arguing that La Violencia caused significant displacement as did pressure from drug traffickers in 
the 1980s).  
 3. LÍNEA DE INVESTIGACIÓN TIERRA Y CONFLICTO, COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE REPARACIÓN Y 
RECONCILIACIÓN (CNRR), EL DESPOJO DE TIERRAS Y TERRITORIOS: APROXIMACIÓN CONCEPTUAL 
53 (2009), http://memoriahistorica-cnrr.org.co/archivos/arc_docum/despojo_tierras_baja.pdf. 
 4. SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ATENCIÓN INTEGRAL A LA POBLACIÓN DESPLAZADA (SNAIPD), 
INFORME DEL GOBIERNO NACIONAL A LA CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL SOBRE LA SUPERACIÓN DEL 
ESTADO DE COSAS INCONSTITUCIONAL DECLARADO MEDIANTE LA SENTENCIA T-025 DE 2004 86 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss1/2
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internally displaced persons (―IDPs‖), dispossessed of approximately 6.6 
million hectares of land.
6
 
In 2005, the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights adopted the 
Pinheiro Principles, which define the rights of refugees and IDPs to return 
to their homes and to recover property.
7
 The stated purpose of the non-
binding Pinheiro Principles was to provide guidelines for one durable 
solution to IDP and refugee crises: the return of the displaced to their 
homes.
 
These principles establish a demanding set of rights, granting the 
right to restitution for the lost homes and land to victims of dispossession 
with limited exceptions: 
All refugees and displaced persons have the right to have restored to 
them any housing, land and/or property of which they were 
arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived, or to be compensated for any 
housing, land and/or property that is factually impossible to restore 
as determined by an independent, impartial tribunal.
8
 
Restitution of this sort differs from reparations in that it consists of the 
return of or compensation for lost property, not of a remedy for other 
 
 
(2010), http://www.acnur.org/pais/docs/2813.pdf?view=1 (citing numbers from the Registro Unico de 
Población Desplazada as of April 2010). See also UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 
REFUGEES (UNHCR), UNHCR GLOBAL TRENDS 2010: 60 YEARS AND STILL COUNTING 21 (2011), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/4dfa11499.html (reporting that there were 3.6 million internally 
displaced persons at the end of 2010). 
 5. Boletin Informativo de la Consultaria para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento No. 
77: ¿Consolidación de qué?, CONSULTORÍA PARA LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS Y EL DESPLAZAMIENTO 
(CODHES), Boletín informativo No. 77, Feb. 15, at 1, 8 (2011), http://www.codhes.org/index.php? 
option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=185&Itemid=50 (reporting the total number of 
people displaced between 1985 and 2010). 
 6. COMISIÓN DE SEGUIMIENTO A LA POLÍTICA PÚBLICA SOBRE DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO, 
CUANTIFICACIÓN Y VALORACIÓN DE LAS TIERRAS Y LOS BIENES ABANDONADOS O DESPOJADOS A LA 
POBLACIÓN DESPLAZADA EN COLOMBIA 8 (Jan. 5, 2011) (reporting that 6.6 million hectares have been 
dispossessed since 1980); see also 5 LUIS JORGE GARAY SALAMANCA ET AL., COMISIÓN DE 
SEGUIMIENTO A LA POLÍTICA PÚBLICA SOBRE DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO, EL RETO ANTE LA 
TRAGEDIA HUMANITARIA DEL DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO: REPARAR DE MANERA INTEGRAL EL 
DESPOJO DE TIERRAS Y BIENES 57 (2009), available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/80257 
08F004CE90B/9C9025369DCE9579C12575E0005439CA/$file/Vol_5_TIERRAS.pdf (reporting that 
5.5 million hectares have been dispossessed since 1998).  
 7. Scott Leckie, Introduction to THE PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES: UNITED NATIONS PRINCIPLES ON 
HOUSING AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS 3 (2005) [hereinafter 
Leckie, Introduction]. 
 8. Special Rapporteur on the Housing and Property in the Context of the Return of Refugees 
and Internally Displaced Persons, Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and 
Displaced Person, U.N. Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
Economic & Social Rights Council, princ. 2.1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17; Comm‘n of Human 
Rights, Sub-Comm‘n on the Promotion of Human Rights, 56th Sess. (June 28, 2005) [hereinafter THE 
PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES] (by Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 
41640c874.html. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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wrongs suffered. In situations of mass dispossession, the required 
restitution or compensation can be expensive because of the costs 
associated both with (1) compensating the many secondary occupants who 
must be evicted to allow the victims to return,
9
 and (2) administering 
multiple restitution proceedings. Independently, both costs can be 
substantial.
10
  
The demanding nature of the Principles has led some to conclude that, 
while the Principles contain appealing standards, there are substantial 
challenges to designing a program that can satisfactorily implement those 
standards in situations of mass dispossession, like those displacements in 
Colombia.
11
 Achieving a durable solution through the return of the 
displaced to their places of origin presents a number of challenges: 
balancing victim choice with incentives to return, ensuring equality of 
access and procedural fairness in the restitution process, and reforming an 
unstable and unjust pattern of land distribution. These challenges constrain 
the design of a program that can successfully implement the Principles. In 
particular, we argue that a developing nation with significant levels of 
dispossession can implement a successful restitution and return program 
under the terms of the Pinheiro Principles only if the program design takes 
a comprehensive approach. A comprehensive program combines 
restitution with strong, centralized administration and support programs 
directed at returning victims. In contrast, a minimalist program design 
might limit its ambitions to establishing a legal mechanism for restitution, 
without providing extensive administration or support for returning 
victims. 
We base our argument in an analysis of the land restitution program 
design contained in the recently passed Ley de Victimas,
12
 as well as 
appropriate contrasts between that design and that of the now-defunct 
Programa de Restitución de Bienes (―Programa Julio‖).13 The current 
 
 
 9. See id. princ. 17. 
 10. See, e.g., Procuraduría General de la Nación, LA VOZ DE LAS REGIONES 114 (2009) (citing 
MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR Y DE JUSTICIA & UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT (USAID), PROGRAMA MÁS INVERSIÓN PARA EL DESARROLLO ALTERNATIVO 
SOSTENIBLE (MIDAS), SUPUESTOS Y CÁLCULOS DE LA INSTANCIA INSTITUCIONAL DE GESTIÓN DE 
RESTITUCIÓN DE BIENES EN LA ATENCIÓN DE VÍCTIMAS DE LA VIOLENCIA (2009)) (reporting estimated 
costs of restitution in Colombia at approximately $250 million U.S. dollars, or $506,848,748,125 in 
Colombian pesos, over five years for 180,000 families, which constitutes just a fraction of the total 
number of displaced families). 
 11. See COMISIÓN DE SEGUIMIENTO, supra note 6. 
 12. Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). 
 13. COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE REPARACIÓN Y RECONCILIACIÓN, PROGRAMA DE RESTITUCIÓN DE 
BIENES (2010) [hereinafter PROGRAMA JULIO], http://internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/ 
006B86436CDDC863C12577C100358343/$file/PRB+(02JUL10)-1.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss1/2
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attempt to implement land restitution, as the first major post-Pinheiro 
Principles restitution effort, evolved with the Principles explicitly in 
mind.
14
 The Ley de Justicia y Paz required the National Commission for 
Reparations and Reconciliation (―CNRR‖) to plan for a comprehensive 
restitution program based on the requirements of the Pinheiro Principles.
15
 
At the start of his term in 2010, President Juan Manuel Santos introduced 
the Ley de Victimas, incorporating several features of the Programa 
design,
16
 and the Colombian Congress passed the Ley in June 2011. Both 
designs combine a legal mechanism for shifting the burden of proof in 
restitution proceedings from the plaintiff to the defendant with various 
administrative bodies and support programs.
17
 The challenges for 
implementing the Pinheiro Principles strongly support the decision that the 
Ley de Victimas establish support programs and administrative bodies and 
suggest that extensive support and centralized administration is required to 
successfully implement the Principles.  
In this Article, we evaluate whether a land restitution policy can 
overcome the challenges for implementing restitution and return under the 
terms of the Pinheiro Principles, using the Colombian Ley de Victimas as 
an example. After explaining the challenges that face any attempt to 
implement restitution and return in compliance with the Pinheiro 
Principles, we will describe the social context in which the Colombian 
government must implement a land restitution program. Second, we will 
describe the details of the Ley de Victimas policy for the restitution and 
return of dispossession victims, as well as touch on a few relevant 
contrasting provisions of the Programa’s design. Third, we will argue that 
the Ley de Victimas broadly complies with the requirements of the 
Pinheiro Principles. Following this background discussion, we will 
examine how the public policy contained in the Ley de Victimas addresses 
the problems with implementing return through restitution and how it 
could better respond to those challenges. We conclude that the challenges 
to implementing restitution and return in accord with the Pinheiro 
Principles constrain the design of a potentially successful public policy: a 
comprehensive, as opposed to minimalist, policy design for restitution and 
 
 
 14. Id. at 7.  
 15. L. 975/05, julio 25, 2005, 45.980 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 44, 46, 49 (Colom.). 
 16. Colombia no será la misma, SEMANA (June 11, 2011), http://www.semana.com/enfoque/ 
colombia-no-sera-misma/158344-3.aspx. 
 17. Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 78 
(Colom.). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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return is more likely to overcome the challenges facing Pinheiro 
Principles-compliant land restitution.  
II. CHALLENGES FOR RETURN IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE PINHEIRO 
PRINCIPLES 
The Pinheiro Principles established a strong international standard 
governing the restitution of property.
18
 They assert that a person has the 
right to restitution of arbitrarily dispossessed property,
19
 regardless of 
whether the person is an IDP or a refugee.
20
 They establish that a state has 
a duty to restore to a dispossessed person the particular property taken 
unless it is factually impossible to restore the property, in which case 
compensation is a sufficient remedy.
21
 Additionally, the Principles 
establish significant requirements for the procedures that a state must 
employ to satisfy the right of restitution, with the aim of making restitution 
 
 
 18. An early version of the Pinheiro Principles emerged in the late 1990s as a standard governing 
the treatment of refugees and IDPs during displacement crises, and became highly visible as a result of 
the conflicts of that period, including those in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. See Leckie, Introduction, 
supra note 7, at 4. The U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
adopted an early statement of restitution rights in 1998. See Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights Res. 1998/26, Housing and Property Restitution in the Context of the Return of Refugees and 
Internally Displaced Persons, Aug. 26, 1998, U.N. Doc. 1998/26 (Aug. 26, 1998), available at http:// 
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3dda64517.html. Following this watershed resolution, the Sub-
Commission asked Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro to develop a more comprehensive approach to restitution 
rights for IDPs and refugees. Leckie, Introduction, supra note 7, at 4. In 2002, the Sub-Commission 
made Pinheiro a Special Rapporteur and requested that he develop his study into draft principles, 
which he submitted to the Sub-Commission in 2004. Id. The Sub-Commission adopted the final 
version of the Principles in 2005. Id. 
 Prior to the Pinheiro Principles, there were a number of international standards concerning the 
appropriate treatment of IDPs. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights proposed a general 
right of return in Article 13(2). Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 
3d Sess., art. 13, U.N. Doc.A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). However, this right of return did not include a 
corresponding right to property restitution. Rhodri C. Williams, Post-Conflict Property Restitution and 
Refugee Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Implications for International Standard-Setting and 
Practice, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 441, 458 (2005). The Deng Principles expanded on this right of 
return. In 1998, the UN Commission on Human Rights endorsed the Deng Principles, which Special 
Rapporteur Francis Deng developed between 1992 and 1998. U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 
Introductory Note by the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons Mr. 
Francis M. Deng, in GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT (2d ed. 2004). First and 
foremost, the Deng Principles require that various actors take measures to prevent displacement from 
occurring and establish standards for the treatment of those who have been displaced. See id. princs. 1–
27. While the Deng Principles impose some weak obligations on governments relating to restitution, 
establishing that IDPs have the right to return to their homes and requiring that governments assist 
IDPs in obtaining restitution or compensation, they do not impose a duty to provide restitution or 
compensation. Id. princs. 28–30.  
 19. See THE PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at princ. 2. 
 20. Id. princ. 1. 
 21. Id. princ. 2.1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss1/2
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accessible to marginalized, dispossessed persons.
22
 As part of these 
procedural standards, the Principles encourage states to adopt a conclusive 
procedural presumption that persons who left their land during a period of 
violence left because of the violence.
23
 Finally, the Principles establish 
rights not only for landowners but also for those with other forms of 
property interests in land, including tenancy.
24
 
Any straightforward attempt to implement land restitution along the 
lines envisioned in the Pinheiro Principles faces substantial challenges to 
securing a durable solution to an IDP crisis through return. First, it is 
difficult to establish the correct balance between promoting return and 
leaving IDPs free to choose other solutions. Second, a restitution program 
is likely to suffer from administrative problems that interfere with its 
ability to adequately restore land and support return. Finally, a 
straightforward implementation of the Pinheiro Principles that does not 
provide comprehensive support may fail to change the circumstances of 
those returning in a way that makes the return stable.  
A. Challenge: Promoting Return with Restitution Programs 
Given that the principles put a strong emphasis on providing victims 
with restitution of their property regardless of their intent to return,
25
 a 
restitution program that complies with the Pinheiro Principles may strike a 
poor balance between encouraging return and protecting victim choice. A 
restitution program design that fails to motivate victims to return will also 
fail to resolve or assist in the resolution of a significant displacement 
problem. Even if the policy motivates the displaced to return, a restitution 
program design must also respect the choice of the displaced to select 
some other resolution to their condition, particularly when return may 
entail risks. 
On the one hand, the primary purpose of a restitution program is to 
facilitate the return to the place of expulsion;
26
 enforcing property rights is 
 
 
 22. Id. princs. 11–15. 
 23. Id. princ. 15.7. 
 24. Id. princs. 16–17. 
 25. Id. princs. 2.1, 21.2; see Giulia Paglione, Individual Property Restitution: From Deng to 
Pinheiro—and the Challenges Ahead, 20 INT. J. REFUGEE L. 391, 407–09 (2008). 
 26. THE PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at 5. However, some find the connection that the 
Principles make between restitution and return problematic. According to Paglione, the Principles do 
not sufficiently separate the remedy for dispossession from the right to return, Paglione, supra note 25, 
at 406–07, potentially resulting in restitution program designs that inappropriately limit victim choice. 
While the Principles do not require that a restitution program make the right to restitution dependent 
on actual return, the Principles do imply that remedies for dispossession exist in order to promote 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
8 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 11:1 
 
 
 
 
a secondary purpose. When victims do not intend to return to the land 
restored to them, a restitution program does not accomplish its goal. If the 
victim does not return to the land, she is likely to either sell the land, 
effectively converting restitution into monetary compensation, or simply 
not use the land, as it is not possible to do so without return. However, 
monetary compensation is often an insufficient way to address displaced 
people‘s problems. While money may provide temporary support for a 
displaced person, it is unlikely to resolve the underlying problems that 
displacement causes, including difficulty adapting to displacement 
conditions that are very different from those in the location of expulsion.
27
 
Restitution is less likely to adequately facilitate return when a large 
number of victims are reluctant to return. For example, in Colombia, only 
5.8% of victims currently express a desire to return, while 34.9% are 
afraid to do so and 12.7% believe the conditions that led to their original 
displacement persist.
28
 A restitution program must find ways to overcome 
victim reluctance and achieve actual return to accomplish the primary goal 
of post-conflict land restitution. 
At the other extreme, the Pinheiro Principles establish that a restitution 
program design may not force a victim to return, either to receive 
restitution or for any other reason: ―All refugees and displaced persons 
have the right to return voluntarily to their former homes, lands or places 
of habitual residence, in safety and dignity. Voluntary return in safety and 
dignity must be based on a free, informed, individual choice.‖29 As part of 
 
 
return. See id. This connection is manifest in the fact that the Principles require that a program admit 
no remedy for dispossession other than restitution under most circumstances, problematically denying 
the dispossessed the right to select alternative remedies such as compensation or resettlement. Id. at 
407–08. But see THE PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, princ. 21.1. Instead, the Principles only 
allow a program design to permit compensation as an alternative remedy when it is factually 
impossible to restore property to the dispossessed. Paglione, supra note 25, at 408. Additionally, return 
is promoted because the Principles do not imply that a program design can impose an explicit time 
limit on the right to restitution, prioritizing restitution regardless of the time that has elapsed and other 
events that have occurred since the dispossession. Id. at 409–12.  
 27. Consumption for displaced households is lower a year after displacement than in the first 
three months following displacement, possibly because savings and humanitarian aid become 
exhausted. See Ana María Ibáñez & Andrés Moya, ¿Cómo el Desplazamiento Forzado Deteriora el 
Bienestar de los Hogares Desplazados?: Análisis y Determinantes del Bienestar en los Municipios de 
Recepción 11 (June 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/ 
content/download/2137/12755/file/d2006-26.pdf. Additionally, part of the problem that confronts 
displaced agricultural workers is a lack of demand for their skills, making it difficult to adapt to their 
new economic conditions. See id. at 13. 
 28. COMISIÓN DE SEGUIMIENTO A LA POLÍTICA PÚBLICA SOBRE DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO 
,INFORME DE VERIFICACIÓN SOBRE EL CUMPLIMIENTO DE DERECHOS DE LA POBLACIÓN EN 
SITUACIÓN DE DESPLAZAMIENTO 39, 41 (2010), available at http://www.codhes.org/index.php?option 
=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=168&Itemid=99999999. 
 29. THE PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, princ. 10.1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss1/2
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this requirement, a restitution program may not condition restitution on 
actual return: ―The right to restitution exists as a distinct right, and is 
prejudiced neither by the actual return nor non-return of refugees and 
displaced persons entitled to housing, land and property restitution.‖30 This 
requirement limits the ways in which a program can use restitution to 
motivate victims to return to their places of origin since, under the 
Principles, restitution programs cannot force victims to return as a 
condition of exercising their property claim. Even though the Pinheiro 
Principles prohibit any requirement that forces victims to return for any 
reason, including to receive restitution,
31
 they do permit a restitution 
program to strongly encourage victims to return so long as the means are 
non-coercive.  
A successful restitution program will have to navigate these two 
extremes within the bounds of the Pinheiro Principles. On the one hand, 
the program design cannot limit victim choice by forcing victims to return 
to their homes. On the other hand, it needs to motivate victims to return in 
order to resolve the problem of internal displacement.  
B. Challenge: Administering Land Restitution and Return 
The Pinheiro Principles require individualized property restitution—
that is, the return to each individual of the particular lost property—which 
poses a number of challenges for administration and implementation.
32
 
The individualized restitution requirement may create problems of fairness 
because restitution can only be accomplished through separate, 
individualized proceedings in each case.
33
 For example, separate and 
individual restitution judgments may prevent or complicate the use of 
factual determinations from one proceeding in other factually related 
proceedings.
34
 Any restitution process will have to address victims 
separately because restitution intrinsically involves the return of specific 
property to specific victims. This restitution, in turn, requires 
individualized adjudicative decisions to determine whether individual 
claimants had rights to particular goods, regardless if an administrative 
agency a court resolves the claims.
35
 A restitution process that involves 
 
 
 30. Id. princ. 2.2. 
 31. Id. princs. 2.2, 10.1. 
 32. Cf. Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 451, 456–
59 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006). 
 33. Cf. id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], Dept. of Int‘l Protection, Housing, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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individual decisions for a large pool of victims may result in two forms of 
unfairness: victims may have unequal access to the restitution institutions, 
and the institutions may follow their own procedures inconsistently. 
Unequal access may arise from geographic or educational differences, 
while procedural inconsistencies may arise from the fact that many 
different officials will be involved in the process. 
Moreover, individualized restitution programs, which the Pinheiro 
Principles require, have potential for coordination problems between the 
restitution program and other reparative and social support programs.
36
 
Victims that seek restitution in order to return home need more than 
restitution of title to property. The victims need comprehensive support to 
restart the lives they were forced to abandon, including support for 
rebuilding homes and livelihoods.
37
 Because the required restitution is 
individualized, but the victims return to geographically dispersed 
locations, victims will depend on local governments and other agencies to 
provide the support and social programs they need to resume their lives.
38
 
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to ensure that victims will have 
access these crucial programs. 
C. Challenge: Transforming the Circumstances of Returnees 
The designs of many restitution programs do not adequately address 
serious inequalities in land distribution or the ability of returnees to take 
advantage of the land once restored to them.
39
 The programs‘ reinstitution 
of the ―status quo‖ prior to dispossession does not effectively end the 
cycle of mass dispossessions. Specifically, a program design that follows 
 
 
Land and Property Rights in Post-Conflict Societies: Proposals for a New United Nations Institutional 
and Policy Framework, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. PPLA/2005/01 (Mar. 2005) (prepared by Scott Leckie) 
[hereinafter Leckie], available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/425689fa4.html. 
 36. Cf. de Greiff, supra note 32, at 458–59; PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 14, at 9. 
 37. See Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, Addendum: Framework on Durable 
Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, ¶ 10-11, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/13/21/Add.4 (Feb. 9, 2010) (prepared by Walter Kälin). 
 38. See de Greiff, supra note 32, at 458–59.  
 39. See Nelson Camilo Sánchez & Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes, Propuestas para una restitución de 
tierras transformadora, in TAREAS PENDIENTES: PROPUESTAS PARA LA FORMULACIÓN DE POLÍTICAS 
PÚBLICAS DE REPARACIÓN EN COLOMBIA 193, 223–43 (Catalina Díaz Gómez ed., 2010); see also 
Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes & María Paula Saffon, Reparaciones Transformadoras, Justicia Distributiva 
y Profundización Democrática, in REPARAR EN COLOMBIA: LOS DILEMAS EN CONTEXTO DE 
CONFLICTO, POBREZA Y EXCLUSIÓN 31, 34–43 (Catalina Díaz et al. eds., 2009); Rodrigo Uprimny 
Yepes, Inaugural Address at Utrecht University: Between Corrective and Distributive Justice: 
Reparations of Gross Human Rights Violations in Times of Transition 7–14 (Oct. 21, 2009), available 
at http://www.uu.nl/university/research/EN/international_collaboration/latinamerica/Documents/Oratie 
RodrigoUprimny.pdf. 
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the Pinheiro Principles may well fail to adequately transform the unequal 
land distributions, across both genders and socioeconomic classes, which 
exist in many states suffering from mass dispossession. Since the Pinheiro 
Principles require that the state fully restore all dispossessed property to its 
owners, even if the owners are or were wealthy, following the principles 
could recreate or exacerbate inequality in an already unequal society under 
certain conditions.  
Inequality in land distribution is closely connected to the inability of 
small plot farmers to take advantage of the land they possess. While small 
plot farms can be more productive per hectare than large-scale farms, even 
though less productive per farmer,
40
 agricultural policy often negatively 
affects their productivity.
41
 As a result, small plot farmers face a number 
of impediments to the productivity of their land, including a lack of 
education, technology, and political connections, as well as government 
policies that focus on large farms.
42
 Without these forms of social support, 
small plot farmers may have inadequate access to the markets, modern 
agricultural techniques, and farm equipment that could make a significant 
difference in their lives. 
Restitution is unlikely to diminish the unequal land distribution across 
socioeconomic classes, which contributes to the unfavorable conditions for 
small plot farmers. Dispossessed farmers who were poor prior to 
dispossession are only entitled to restitution of relatively low value 
property, while those victims who were wealthier prior to dispossession 
receive more. Similarly, restitution is unlikely to close the gap between the 
poor and those who were wealthier prior to receiving restitution. Indeed, 
the gap could be exacerbated if the dispossessed who are currently 
wealthier generally lost more property via dispossession than those who 
are currently poorer.  
Restitution is also unlikely to promote gender equality in land holdings. 
Although the Pinheiro Principles themselves might require restitution that 
improves the unequal land distribution across genders,
43
 a restitution 
program that does not focus on gender equality in land titles will not 
improve this form of inequality under many circumstances. If men held 
 
 
 40. Albert Berry, The Economics of Land Reform and of Small Farms in Developing Countries: 
Implications for Post-conflict Situations, in DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN TRANSITIONS 25, 30–31 (Morten 
Bergsmo et al. eds., 2010), http://www.fichl.org/fileadmin/fichl/documents/FICHL_6_web.pdf (reporting 
that, for example, the value added per effective hectare for a farm of five or fewer hectares in 
Colombia historically has been twice the value added for a farm of 500 hectares or greater). 
 41. Id. at 29–30. 
 42. Id. 
 43. THE PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, princ. 4.2. 
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title to the majority of land prior to dispossession, restoring title will not 
increase the gender equality of land holdings. As a result, straightforward 
restitution of land will often recreate the prior unequal distribution of land 
holdings between men and women, even if women are equally entitled to 
land restitution. 
The fact that a public policy implementing the Pinheiro Principles is 
likely to maintain or exacerbate inequality is problematic for returning 
victims for at least two reasons. First, the land distribution in many 
societies with displacement crises is so unequal that it is unjust, both 
across socioeconomic classes and across genders.
44
 In such circumstances, 
restoring a poor person to her pre-dispossessed state of poverty may 
violate her human rights or the fundamental requirements of distributive 
justice.
45
 Second, although expert opinions are divided, inequality in land 
distribution might contribute to the sort of violence that produces mass 
dispossession, making a restitution effort that maintains or exacerbates 
inequality ultimately counterproductive.
46
 At a minimum, conflict between 
large landholders and small plot farmers has been characteristic of 
Colombian civil conflict since the middle to late 1800s.
47
 If land inequality 
caused the conflict that resulted in dispossession of the land, the failure to 
transform the unequal land distribution undermines assurances of non-
recurrence of displacement and dispossession.  
D. Challenge: Financial Constraints 
The requirement of full restitution of all dispossessed property may 
place an enormous strain on public funds to the extent that it could be 
effectively impossible to satisfy the claims of all the victims, particularly 
while satisfying the other legitimate demands on state resources.
48
 While a 
restitution program may be less expensive than many reparations programs 
 
 
 44. Sánchez & Uprimny, supra note 39, at 226. 
 45. Id. at 229. 
 46. See, e.g., Maria Paula Saffon, The Project of Land Restitution in Colombia: An Illustration of 
the Civilizing Force of Hypocrisy? 12(2) REVISTA ESTUDIOS SOCIO-JURÍDICOS 109, 116–17 (2010), 
http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/redalyc/pdf/733/73315636005.pdf (claiming that the unequal distribution of 
land in Colombia is a primary cause of the protracted armed conflict). But see Paul Collier & Anke 
Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 56 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 563, 587–89 (2004) 
(concluding that land inequality has limited general impact on civil wars worldwide). 
 47. See generally Catherine LeGrand, Los antecedentes agrarios de la violencia: el conflicto 
social en la frontera colombiana, 1850–1936, in PASADO Y PRESENTE DE LA VIOLENCIA EN COLOMBIA 
(Gonzalo Sánchez & Ricardo Peñaranda eds., 2007) (describing continuous but evolving conflicts 
between small plot farmers and large land-holders from the mid 1800s through the 1930s). 
 48. Cf. id. at 456. 
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because the state may not have to pay for the restored land,
49
 it nonetheless 
has substantial costs.
50
 Carrying out restitution requires the creation or 
allocation of judicial or quasi-judicial mechanisms for verifying that a 
claimant has a legitimate claim to the property.
51
 When property occupied 
by a good faith third party is restored to the original owner, the program 
may have to pay compensation to the third party.
52
 Moreover, a restitution 
program will have to establish means to protect property rights, such as 
land registries, and to prevent the illegitimate buying and selling of 
property.
53
 These costs, as well as the overall success of the program, will 
determine whether a restitution program is a sound social investment. 
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO LAND RESTITUTION IN COLOMBIA 
In this section we will describe the factual background to land 
restitution in Colombia. First, we will describe how land dispossession 
arose and is structured, as well as the institutional and contextual 
challenges to land restitution in Colombia. Then, we will describe the 
process that led to the development of the Ley de Victimas land restitution 
proposal considered in the rest of this Article.  
A. Conflict, Displacement, and Dispossession 
Colombia has been in a state of armed conflict for over forty years.
54
 
The current civil conflict originated in the quasi-civil war, known as La 
Violencia, between the then dominant Liberal and Conservative political 
parties.
55
 La Violencia began in the mid-1940s, possibly as the result of 
 
 
 49. See, e.g., PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13 (reporting that the program will not compensate 
many categories of secondary occupants); Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO 
OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 98, 113 (Colom.) (establishing that the funds for the program will come from 
several sources other than the general budget). 
 50. See, e.g., Procuraduría General, supra note 10, at 114 (reporting that restitution for 180,000 
families in Colombia would cost approximately $250 million U.S. dollars or $506,848,748,125 pesos 
over five years). 
 51. See Leckie, supra note 35, at 14 (arguing that judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative 
mechanisms are necessary to formally resolve housing disputes and officially recognize land rights 
after a conflict).  
 52. See THE PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, princ. 17.1. 
 53. See id. princ. 18. 
 54. See MARCO PALACIOS, BETWEEN LEGITIMACY AND VIOLENCE 157–69, 190–93, 203–13, 
240–45 (Richard Stoller trans. 2002); see also Report on the Demobilization Process in Colombia, 
Inter-Am. Comm‘n H.R., OEA/ser.L/V/II.120, doc. 60, 17–18 (Dec. 13, 2004). 
 55. See PALACIOS, supra note 54, at 157–69; see also Inter-Am. Comm‘n H.R., supra note 54, at 
17. 
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vote competition in rural areas.
56
 It became a severe crisis following the 
assassination of Liberal Party leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in 1948 and 
lasted until sometime between 1953
57
 and the early 1960s.
58
 Between 1964 
and the 1980s, various leftist guerrilla forces emerged, including FARC,
59
 
ELN,
60
 EPL,
61
 and M-19.
62
 By the early 1970s, wealthy Colombians, 
ostensibly threatened by these revolutionary groups, began to form self-
defense forces supported by the military and police.
63
 The self-defense 
forces evolved into paramilitary organizations that violently defended the 
drug trade and elite economic interests, engaging in murders and 
massacres.
64
 Illegal armed paramilitary and guerrilla groups have created a 
persistent state of insecurity, particularly in rural Colombia.
65 
The security 
crisis continues to the present as a result of continued guerrilla violence, as 
well as violence from the new illegal armed groups that emerged 
following the paramilitary demobilization in 2005.
66
 
The ongoing conflict has produced one of the largest number of IDPs 
in any country in the world.
67
 The primary causes of internal displacement 
are attacks by the guerrilla and paramilitary groups that have been active 
in Colombia.
68
 Estimates of the numbers of IDPs as of 2010 range from 
3.4
69
 to 5.2
70
 million. Estimates of the land lost by the displaced range 
more broadly from a 2006 estimate of 1.2 million hectares
71
 to a 2010 
 
 
 56. See PALACIOS, supra note 54, at 157 (relying on research by Paul Oquist). 
 57. See id. at 151. In 1953, the dictatorship of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla decreased the importance of 
controlling votes. See id. at 151, 165. Following the dictatorship, in 1958 the National Front 
maintained the diminished importance of votes by designating a set number of positions for each 
political party and alternating the presidency between them. Id. at 155–56. 
 58. See PALACIOS, supra note 54, at 164–66. 
 59. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. Report on the Demobilization process in 
Colombia, Inter-Am. Comm‘n. H.R., supra note 54, ¶ 35. 
 60. Ejército de Liberación Nacional. Report on the Demobilization Process in Colombia, Inter-
Am. Comm‘n H.R., supra note 54, at 2. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, Inter-Am. Comm‘n H.R., supra note 54, ¶ 42. 
 65. See SNAIPD, supra note 4, at 86. 
 66. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PARAMILITARIES‘ HEIRS: THE NEW FACE OF VIOLENCE IN 
COLOMBIA 36 (2010); INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, COLOMBIA‘S NEW ARMED GROUPS 2 (May 10, 
2007), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/20_colombia_s_new_armed_ 
groups.pdf. 
 67. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTER, COLOMBIA 1 (2010), http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/18EFD5E90A66EA75C1257725006524C1/$fil
e/GO2009_Colombia.pdf. 
 68. Garay, supra note 6, at 34–35; PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 17. 
 69. SNAIPD, supra note 4, at 86.  
 70. CODHES, supra note 5, at 1.  
 71. Ana María Ibáñez, Andrés Moya & Andrea Velásquez, Hacia una Política Proactiva para la 
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estimate of 10 million hectares.
72
 A group of experts recently asserted that 
6.6 million hectares, or 15.4% of the agricultural land in Colombia, has 
been taken.
73
 Poor rural farmers comprise the vast majority of people 
displaced and dispossessed.
74
 
This mass dispossession of land has occurred in a country where 
agrarian reform has repeatedly failed, leaving land ownership highly 
concentrated. An attempt in 1936 to clear up land titles granted the right to 
claim land to any person who had exploited the land in good faith for five 
years.
75
 Unfortunately, the law provoked landowners to expel peasants 
from their land en masse and provide large landowners with a legal 
mechanism to claim formal title to vacant land that they had 
appropriated.
76
 In 1944, the government withdrew the attempt at reform by 
passing a law protecting ownership of unused land.
77
 To reverse the land 
concentration that La Violencia caused, the government began an attempt 
to encourage the productive use of land in 1961,
78
 eventually permitting 
those working land to acquire title to that land under certain conditions.
79
 
Again mass expulsions resulted, and the government officially withdrew 
the reform in 1975.
80
 In 1988, the government made yet another attempt at 
land reform with a law simplifying land transactions and granting land to 
peasants and demobilized combatants, but the law failed to significantly 
affect land distribution or agrarian structure.
81
  
The result of Colombian land policy and civil conflict in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries is not encouraging, amounting to an agrarian 
counter-reform. By 2003, 0.4% of landowners held 62.3% of estates over 
500 hectares while 86.3% of landowners held only 8.8% of estates under 
 
 
Población Desplazada, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT‘L DEVELOPMENT 132 (2006), http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/664A37C39F38E4C8C1257225003A728C/$file/Informe+final
+28+de+febrero+2006.pdf. 
 72. Estrategia Contra la Impunidad y Herramienta para la Reparación Integral, MOVIMIENTO 
DE VICTIMAS DE CRIMINES DEL ESTADO (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.movimientodevictimas.org/index 
.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=280&Itemid=69. 
 73. COMISIÓN DE SEGUIMIENTO, supra note 6, at 7.  
 74. See SNAIPD, supra note 4, at 86. 
 75. Saffon, supra note 46, at 117–18. 
 76. Absalón Machado C., Propuesta de elementos para una política de tierras en medio del 
conflicto, in DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO ¿HASTA CUÁNDO UN ESTADO DE COSAS 
INCONSTITUCIONAL? TOMO II 13 (Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y Desplazamiento 
CODHES ed., 2010); Saffon, supra note 46, at 117–8. 
 77. Machado, supra note 76, at 13. 
 78. Saffon, supra note 46, at 119. 
 79. L. 1/68, enero 26, 1968, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.); Machado, supra note 76, at 13; 
see also Saffon, supra note 46, at 3. 
 80. L. 6/75, enero 10, 1975, Diario Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.); Machado, supra note 76, at 14. 
 81. L. 30/88, marzo, 18, 1988, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.); Machado, supra note 76, at 14. 
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twenty hectares.
82
 Estates of less than twenty hectares occupied 8.8% of 
the land area, and those of greater than 500 hectares occupied 62.5% of the 
area.
83
 Moreover, the land registry, or cadastre, in Colombia has not been 
updated since 1994. In 2007, 54% of estates did not have current 
registries.
84
 Additionally, the land registry does not include property rights 
other than ownership, such as possession and tenancy.
85
 Finally, large 
landowners, due to their political influence, are subject to abnormally low 
property taxes.
86
 In 1990, Ley 44 imposed property taxes between .1% and 
1.6% of the property valuation, depending on the social stratum of the 
owner, the use of the land, and the age of the land registration.
87
 However, 
in Bolivar, La Guajira, Magdalena, and Sucre, for example, landowners 
typically paid less than .1% of the land value in property taxes.
88
 In 
addition, rural land was substantially undervalued for tax purposes, with 
land in cities comprising 84.9% of the total official land value and land in 
rural areas comprising 15.4% in 2003.
89
 
Colombia faces the unique challenge of implementing a land restitution 
program for IDPs without a substantial change in the circumstances that 
created the displacement. State institutions and individual politicians who 
were deeply involved in creating, supporting, and using the paramilitaries 
remain in place. The Colombian military supported the creation of the 
paramilitaries, conducted joint military actions with them, and aided their 
attacks on civilians.
90
 The national government allowed the creation of 
armed self-defense forces through the CONVIVIR program,
91
 an action 
that aided the growth of illegal paramilitary groups nationwide.
92
 Local 
 
 
 82. Carlos Salgado Araméndez, Propuestas frente a las restricciones estructurales y políticas 
para la reparación efectiva de las tierras perdidas por la población desplazada, in DESPLAZAMIENTO 
FORZADO ¿HASTA CUÁNDO UN ESTADO DE COSAS INCONSTITUCIONAL? TOMO II 37 (Consultoría para 
los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento CODHES ed., 2010). 
 83. Id. at 37. 
 84. Rodrigo Uprimny & María Paula Saffon, Reparaciones Transformadoras, Justicia 
Distributiva y Profundización Democrática, in REPARAR IN COLOMBIA: LOS DILEMAS EN CONTEXTOS 
DE CONFLICTO, POBREZA, Y EXCLUSIÓN 31, 51 n.38 (Catalina Díaz Gómez, Nelson Camilo Sánchez & 
Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes eds., 2009). 
 85. Saffon, supra note 76, at 6. 
 86. See SALMÓN KALMONOVITZ & ENRIQUE LÓPEZ ENCISO, LA AGRICULTURA COLOMBIANA EN 
EL SIGLO XX 350–51 (2006). 
 87. Id. at 350. 
 88. Id. at 351. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See COMISIÓN COLOMBIANA DE JURISTAS, COLOMBIA: LA METÁFORA DEL 
DESMANTELAMIENTO DE LOS GRUPOS PARAMILITARES 149–52 (2010); see generally HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, THE ―SIXTH DIVISION‖: MILITARY-PARAMILITARY TIES AND U.S. POLICY IN COLOMBIA 
(2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/colombia/. 
 91. L. 356/94, febrero 14, 1994, 41.220 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). 
 92. See COMISIÓN COLOMBIANA DE JURISTAS, supra note 90, at 152–53. 
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elites, including politicians, landowners, and businessmen, frequently 
supported the expansion of paramilitary groups into their regions.
93
 At the 
national level, many politicians had connections with the paramilitaries. A 
substantial portion of the Colombian Congress was accused of 
paramilitary involvement, including ex-Senator Mario Uribe, a cousin and 
political ally of the former president.
94
 While some of the politicians 
involved in these scandals have been replaced, many of the political 
interests that collaborated with illegal armed groups are still represented in 
the government, and there is some evidence that the links between state 
institutions and paramilitary successor groups persist.
95
 
The continuing conflict and its enabling conditions create problems 
both for the immediate security of those trying to obtain land restitution 
and for those attempting to provide credible assurances that displacement 
and dispossession will not recur. The immediate security of those 
attempting to return to their land has become a significant problem. 
Although paramilitary groups have largely demobilized and the level of 
guerrilla activity has dropped significantly in the last decade, two major 
guerrilla groups persist and new illegal armed groups contribute to 
ongoing conflict.
96
 Since the 2005 Justice and Peace Law required 
paramilitaries to provide restitution to victims,
97
 at least forty-five people 
asserting rights to land restitution have been murdered, while many more 
have received threats.
98
 For example, in less than fifteen days in 2009, 
three leaders of groups promoting restitution rights were murdered.
99
 New 
illegal armed groups, which formed out of the remnants of the paramilitary 
organizations, actively and illegally oppose land restitution, allegedly 
murdering four leaders of victims‘ groups in Urabá.100  
 
 
 93. See, e.g., id. at 154. 
 94. La ‘para-politica’, VERDADABIERTA.COM, http://www.verdadabierta.com/parapolitica/ 
nacional/2595-la-para-politica (last visited Feb. 25, 2011) (reporting that ninety-one members of 
congress have been accused of paramilitary ties, including Mario Uribe); Mario Uribe Escobar: La 
Caída de un Cacique, VERDADABIERTA.COM, http://www.verdadabierta.com/index.php?option=com 
_content&id=3045 (last visited Feb. 25, 2011) (reporting that Mario Uribe was convicted of having 
connections to the paramilitaries). 
 95. See COMISIÓN COLOMBIANA DE JURISTAS, supra note 90, at 85–89. 
 96. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, IMPROVING SECURITY POLICY IN COLOMBIA (June 29, 
2010), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/colombia/B23%20Improving%20Security 
%20Policy%20in%20Colombia.pdf. The ongoing conflict makes it difficult to determine the number of 
victims with claims for restitution because the number continues to increase. 
 97. L. 975/05 julio 25, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], arts. 44, 46, 49 (Colom.). 
 98. Ya Son 45 Los Líderes De Víctimas Asesinados Por Reclamar Sus Tierras; En 15 Días 
Murieron Tres, EL TIEMPO (June 2, 2010), http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/justicia/ya-son-45-los-
lideres-de-victimas-asesinados-por-reclamar-sus-tierras_7737280-1. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Los están matando, SEMANA (Mar. 14, 2009), http://www.semana.com/nacion/estan-
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Despite these challenging circumstances, Colombian constitutionalism 
is a source of support for the implementation of a restitution program. 
Colombian constitutionalism has placed significant pressure on the state to 
implement a strong restitution program because the Constitution, 
vigorously enforced by the Constitutional Court, requires a robust 
restitution program. In 2004, the Constitutional Court held that the 
circumstances of IDPs in Colombia comprised an unconstitutional state of 
affairs,
101
 meaning that ―there is a recurrent violation of the fundamental 
rights of many persons, the solution of which requires the coordinated 
intervention of different State agencies.‖102 The Court then ordered the 
Colombian government to address the unconstitutional state of affairs in 
accordance with international standards.
103
 It later clarified that these 
standards include the Pinheiro Principles.
104
  
In addition to the Constitutional Court, the international community 
pressured Colombia to implement a restitution program and address the 
problem of internal displacement generally. Intergovernmental human 
rights organizations such as the United Nations Committee on Human 
Rights
105
 and the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights,
106
 as well 
as prominent international non-governmental organizations, such as 
Amnesty International
107
 and Human Rights Watch,
108
 stressed the 
importance of access to restitution. The international community has also 
 
 
matando/121735-3.aspx. 
 101. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero 22, 2004, Sentencia T-025, Gaceta 
de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Resulve Cuarto) (Colom.). 
 102. Saffon, supra note 46, at 132 n.98. 
 103. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], octubre 14, 2010, Sentencia T-821, 
Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] ¶ 71 (Colom.); cf. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 7. 
 104. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], diciembre 18, 2009, Sentencia T-967, 
Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Part 4) (Colom.) (―Finally, this Court cannot overlook the 
importance of the Deng and Pinheiro principles for resolving the matter under review, international 
law instruments that form part of the block of constitutionality in the broad sense, which is the reason 
they become relevant interpretational criteria or guidelines for guaranteeing the enjoyment of the 
fundamental constitutional rights of the forcibly displaced population.‖ (translated by author)); cf. 
PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 7. 
 105. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Examen de los informes presentados por los Estados partes 
en virtud de artículo 40 del Pacto, ¶ 23, CCPR/C/COL/CO/6 (July 28, 2010), http://daccess-ods.un 
.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=CCPR/C/COL/CO/6&Lang=E; see also Representative of the 
Secretary-General, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of 
Internally Displaced Persons, ¶¶ 71–86, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/ 
38/Add.3 (Jan. 24, 2007) (prepared by Walter Kälin). 
 106. Principle Guidelines for a Comprehensive Restitution Policy, Inter-Am. Comm‘n H.R., 
Report No. 1/08, OEA/Ser/L/V/II.131 doc. 1 (2008). 
 107. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, U.N. Human Rights Council Tenth Session, Compilation of 
Statements by Amnesty International, IOR 41/011/2009 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.amnesty 
.org/en/library/info/IOR41/011/2009/en.  
 108. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 66, at 16, 17, 25–28. 
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aided Colombia‘s efforts to respond to its endemic violence. For example, 
in the early 2000s, the World Bank supported projects to protect land 
rights in rural Colombia.
109
 Previously, USAID funded initiatives that 
support the return of IDPs, such as a program in the Montes de María 
region.
110
 Currently, the Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency funds the Misión Apoyo el Proceso de Paz of the Organization of 
American States,
111
 which has provided support for displaced persons.
112
  
B. The Road to Land Restitution 
The process leading to land restitution in Colombia, which began with 
initiatives in the late 1990s, has been drawn out and complex. Following 
Ley 387 of 1997,
113
 the government established a number of different 
programs designed to provide humanitarian aid
114
 and protect the rights of 
displaced persons,
115
 recognizing displacement as a problem. In 2000, the 
government created a registry of IDPs, established regional committees at 
 
 
 109. See Protection of Patrimonial Assets of Colombia's Internally Displaced Population, THE 
WORLD BANK, STATE-AND PEACE-BUILDING GRANT DATABASE, http://go.worldbank.org/LO5LK5 
MLZ0 (last visited Feb. 25, 2011); see also Elena Correa, PCF Occasional Note Protecting the 
Patrimonial Assets of Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia, THE WORLD BANK, THE POST-
CONFLICT FUND, Nov. 2004, 2 http://go.worldbank.org/TFSMVK2Z70 (discussing the World Bank 
initiatives). The World Bank has also funded projects that deal with the IDP problem more broadly. 
See generally THE WORLD BANK, PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT ON A PROPOSED LOAN IN THE 
AMOUNT OF US$30 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA FOR A PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT 
PROJECT IN SUPPORT OF THE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (2004), http://www-wds 
.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/05/24/000160016_20040524094
518/Rendered/PDF/28656.pdf (reporting the review by the World Bank in considering a loan of $30 
million to Colombia to advance development through peaceful measures).  
 110. USAID/OTI Colombia Quarterly Report April, USAID TRANSITION INITIATIVES, Apr.–June 
2009, at 3, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACP738.pdf. 
 111. Our Work In Colombia: Negotiations—the solution for Colombia, SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY, http://www.sida.se/English/Countries-and-regions/Latin-
America/Colombia/Our-work-in-Colombia/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
 112. Qué es la MAPP/OEA, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, MISIÓN APOYO EL PROCESO 
DE PAZ, http://www.mapp-oea.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=58:que-es-la-
mappoea-&catid=38&Itemid=27 (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
 113. L. 387/97, julio 24, 1997, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). 
 114. Cf. id. art. 15 (requiring the national government to attend to the needs of displaced persons 
including physical and mental health, food, and housing). 
 115. See SISTEMA NACIONAL DE ATENCIÓN INTEGRAL A LA POBLACIÓN DESPLAZADA, POLÍTICA 
PUBLICA DE RETORNO PARA LA POBLACIÓN EN SITUACIÓN DE DESPLAZAMIENTO (PPR)  ( 2009), 
http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/documentos/4636_Pol%C3%ADtica_P%C3%BAblica_de_Retornos.p
df; cf. L. 387/97, julio 24 1997, art. 4 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.); L. 173/98, enero 26, 1998, 
DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.); L. 387/97, julio 18, 1997, art. 9 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.); 
PRESIDENCIA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, ACUERDOS DEL CONSEJO NACIONAL DE ATENCIÓN 
INTEGRAL A LA POBLACIÓN DESPLAZADA ACUERDOS DEL CONSEJO (2005), available at http://www 
.dnp.gov.co/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=G-v9skBqzbU%3D&tabid=1080; L. 501/98, mayo 25, 1998, 
DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.); L. 489/99, diciembre 29, 1999, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). 
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various levels to address the problem of displaced persons,
116
 and made 
forcible displacement a criminal act.
117
 The following year, the 
government began programs to protect rural land holdings, including land 
registers
118
 and limitations on land transfers in areas experiencing 
displacement.
119
 However, the government did not begin to implement 
these protections until 2004. In general, the actions in this period 
attempted to protect IDPs as well as prevent forcible displacement and 
dispossession, but a lack of institutional coordination limited their 
effectiveness.
120
  
Basing its authority in Ley 387 and subsequent land protection 
initiatives, the Protection of Land and Patrimony Project (Proyecto de 
Protección de Tierra y Patrimonio de la Población Displazada) developed 
the institutional capacity to protect land rights. Between July 2003 and 
June 2005, the Project implemented a pilot land rights protection program, 
which focused on two populations: (1) those already displaced, via the 
individual route, and (2) those in an area with a high risk of displacement, 
via the collective route.
121
 The individual route prevents the illegal transfer 
of property title after the titleholder has been displaced. Following the 
application of a displaced person, Instituto Colombiano para el Desarrollo 
Rural (―INCODER‖) registers the property in Registro Unico de Predios y 
Territorios Abandonados (―RUPTA‖).122 Once the property is registered in 
RUPTA, property cannot legally transfer without official confirmation that 
the transfer is voluntary, impeding the legalization of dispossession.
123
 
With the collective route, the Comités Territoriales para la Atención 
Integral de la Población Desplazada (―CTAIPDs‖) respond to the 
 
 
 116. L. 2569/00, deciembre 12, 2000, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 29–3 (Colom.). 
 117. L. 589/00, julio 6, 2000, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 268 (Colom.). 
 118. L. 2007/01, septiembre 24, 2001 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 1, 2 (Colom.). 
 119. Id. arts. 1, 4. 
 120. DEPARTAMENTO DE PLANEACIÓN, REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA, CONPES 3057 DE 1999: PLAN 
DE ACCIÓN PARA LA PREVENCIÓN Y ATENCIÓN DEL DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO 10–14 (Nov. 10, 1999) 
http://www.dnp.gov.co/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=3TeWl3PGdrU%3D&tabid=1080; RODRÍGUEZ & 
RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 1, at 78–79. 
 121. ACCIÓN SOCIAL , PROYECTO DE PROTECCIÓN DE TIERRAS Y PATRIMONIO DE LA POBLACION 
DE LA DESPLAZADA, PROJECT ON PROTECTION OF LAND AND PATRIMONY OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED 
PERSONS, BACKGROUND DOCUMENT FOR THE ―WORKSHOP ON THE PROTECTION OF LAND RIGHTS 
AND PATRIMONY OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS—BUILDING ON THE COLOMBIAN 
EXPERIENCE‖ 14–15 (2010), http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/documentos/Tierras_Doc/Workshop% 
20On%20The%20Protection%20Of%20Land%20Rights%20And%20Patrimony.pdf. 
 122. ACCIÓN SOCIAL, PROYECTO DE PROTECCIÓN DE TIERRAS Y PATRIMONIO, RUTA DE 
PROTECCIÓN INDIVIDUAL 1 (2010), http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/documentos/Tierras_Doc/RUTA_ 
INDIVIDUAL.pdf. 
 123. Id. at 2. 
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circumstances in an area that caused or could cause displacement.
124
 They 
identify the people at risk of property dispossession and employ similar 
measures to prevent illegal property title transfers.
125
 Between September 
2005 and March 2008, the Project expanded the geographically-limited 
pilot program to cover significantly more territory and added a focus on 
protecting the land rights of indigenous and afro-Colombian 
communities.
126
 While these efforts developed important institutional 
capacity,
127
 they failed to prevent further displacement and land 
dispossession.
128
 
In 2004 and 2005, the legal situation changed dramatically, first, with 
the Constitutional Court‘s Sentencia T-025 in 2004, and second, with the 
passage of the Justice and Peace Law in 2005.
129
 Sentencia T-025 held that 
the extremely vulnerable condition of displaced persons in Colombia 
constituted an unconstitutional state of affairs and that the government had 
to address those conditions.
130
 While the decision ordered various 
government bodies to take steps to resolve the unconstitutional state of 
affairs, it did not provide specific details. Instead, the decision initiated a 
court-supervised process to develop and carry out a comprehensive 
policy.
131
 The Sentencia itself, while concerned with ensuring displaced 
persons‘ rights with regard to return to their property,132 did not order the 
government to implement a restitution program. However, it definitively 
established displacement victims‘ rights to truth, justice, and 
reparations.
133
  
The Justice and Peace Law had a broad focus that extended beyond the 
problem of IDPs. With this law, Colombia began to pursue paradigmatic 
transitional justice mechanisms intended to respond to the legacy of civil 
 
 
 124. ACCIÓN SOCIAL, PROYECTO DE PROTECCIÓN DE TIERRAS Y PATRIMONIO, RUTA DE 
PROTECCIÓN COLECTIVA, 1 (2010), http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/documentos/Tierras_Doc/RUTA_ 
COLECTIVA.pdf. 
 125. Id. 
 126. ACCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 121, at 24. 
 127. See id. at 24–26. 
 128. COMISIÓN DE SEGUIMIENTO, supra note 6, at 10 (reporting that 351,210 hectares of land have 
been dispossessed between 2009 and July 2010); see also Desplazan a 72 familias en norte de 
Colombia por combates entre bandas, DIARIO ABC (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.abc.com.py/nota/ 
desplazan-a-72-familias-en-norte-de-colombia-por-combantes-entre-bandas/; cf. ACCIÓN SOCIAL, 
supra note 121, at 29 (reporting that land protection measures need to be increased in 300 
municipalities and for ethnic groups). 
 129. See L. 975/05, julio 25, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). 
 130. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero 22, 2004, Sentencia T-025, 
Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.], ¶ 2.2 (Colom.). 
 131. See, e.g., id. 
 132. See id. ¶ 2.2. 
 133. Id. ¶ 10.1.4(9). 
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conflict,
134
 albeit in the unusual context of an ongoing conflict.
135
 The 
statute‘s most prominent effect was to create a demobilization program for 
paramilitaries, including a partial amnesty for those paramilitaries who 
demobilized, confessed crimes, and turned in illegally obtained assets.
136
 
Additionally, the law established two primary ways for victims of 
paramilitaries to secure reparations. First, if the victim could identify the 
particular perpetrator of a crime, the victim could directly demand 
reparations from that perpetrator.
137
 Second, if the victim was unable to 
identify the particular perpetrator, the victim could obtain reparations from 
the Reparations Fund, comprised of illegally obtained goods turned in by 
demobilizing paramilitaries.
138
 Finally, in what later turned out to be 
important, the law also ordered the National Commission for Reparation 
and Reconciliation (―CNRR‖) to develop a property restitution program.139  
In 2009, the Constitution Court issued Auto 008, which clarified and 
expanded upon the orders originally issued in T-025. The Court 
recognized that the unconstitutional state of affairs addressed in T-025 
persisted and ordered the Director of Social Action, the government 
agency in charge of social programs for vulnerable populations, to present 
a report proposing ways to overcome the unconstitutional state of 
affairs.
140
 Most importantly, the Court ordered the Ministry of the Interior 
and the Director of National Planning to develop a comprehensive reform 
of land policy, which the Court itself would oversee.
141
 The new land 
policy was to contain a comprehensive restitution policy, including 
subsidiary programs necessary to support restitution.
142
 As with T-025, the 
Court left it to the government to determine the details of the new land 
policy, subject to the Court‘s oversight. 
 
 
 134. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 18, 2006, Sentencia C-370, 
Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] ¶¶ 6.2.4.1.7–6.2.4.1.12 (Colom.). See generally SERGIO 
JARAMILLO, YANET GIHA & PAULA TORRES, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, 
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION AMIDST THE CONFLICT: THE CASE OF 
COLOMBIA (2009), http://www.ictj.org/en/research/projects/ddr/country-cases/2379.html (describing 
the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of various groups). 
 135. However, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is another prominent 
example of a transitional justice mechanism established during an ongoing conflict in the hope that it 
would help resolve the conflict. See Ruti Teitel, Bringing the Messiah Through the Law, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS 177, 178–79 (Hesse & Post eds. 1999). 
 136. L. 975/05, julio 25, 2005, art. 24, 25, 29 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). 
 137. Id. art. 23. 
 138. Id. art. 54. 
 139. Id. arts. 44, 46, 49. 
 140. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero 26, 2009, Auto 008, Gaceta de la 
Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] ¶ 83 (Colom.). 
 141. See id. ¶ 1. 
 142. See id. ¶ 83. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss1/2
  
 
 
 
 
2012] THE COLOMBIAN LAND RESTITUTION EXPERIENCE  23 
 
 
 
 
The government complied with Auto 008 in October 2009 by issuing 
the Lineamientos de Política de Tierras y Territorios (―Lineamientos‖),143 
which outlined the structure of the new land policy. The broad policy 
contained several initiatives: (1) on land issues connected to displacement, 
(2) on establishing programs to prevent dispossession, (3) to protect the 
land of displaced property owners, (4) to provide reparations for displaced 
tenants, (5) to formalize and secure land rights, to strengthen institutional 
capacity, and (6) to improve information systems.
144
 In addition to these 
measures, it incorporated a land restitution program as a central part of the 
new land policy.
145
 The land restitution program that the Lineamientos 
proposed was to be implemented through the Property Restitution 
Program, merging the legal development of a restitution program 
originating in the Justice and Peace Law with the orders from Sentencia T-
025 and Auto 008.
146
  
When Juan Manuel Santos replaced Alvaro Uribe as the President of 
Colombia on August 7, 2010, he quickly changed course on many of his 
predecessor‘s policies, including land restitution. He introduced draft 
legislation for a Ley de Tierras (Land Law) on September 7, 2010, 
significantly reshaping land restitution policy in Colombia.
147
 During the 
congressional debates, the Ley de Tierras was combined with the Ley de 
Victimas (Victim‘s Law), another law project introduced at the same time 
as the Ley de Tierras. In particular, the draft Ley de Victimas eliminated 
most of the special programs for support and monitoring the restitution 
process that the Programa contained, while leaving primarily the shift of 
the burden of proof from victim to land-occupier. On June 10, 2011, the 
Ley de Victimas was signed into law, as Ley 1448 de 2011.
148
  
In the midst of this upheaval, the Constitutional Court released Auto 
383 (2010), again following up its decision in Sentencia T-025 (2004) on 
the status of displaced persons. Auto 383 recognizes that the massive 
 
 
 143. DEPARTAMENTO NACIONAL DE PLANEACIÓN, MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA Y DESARROLLO 
RURAL, MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR Y DE JUSTICIA & AGENCIA PRESIDENCIAL PARA LA ACCIÓN 
SOCIAL Y LA COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL, LINEAMIENTOS DE POLÍTICA DE TIERRAS Y 
TERRITORIOS PARA POBLACIÓN VÍCTIMA DEL DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO, EN RIESGO DE 
DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO Y DEL DESPOJO (2009), available at http://www.dnp.gov.co/PortalWeb/ 
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=IHPNyCIWyYg%3D&tabid=1080. 
 144. Id. at 19, 23, 29, 32, 47, 50. 
 145. See id. at 53. 
 146. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 7–9. 
 147. Ley de tierras y ley de victimas tendrán capítulo de restitución a desplazados, SEMANA 
(Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/ley-tierras-ley-victimas-tendran-capitulo-
restitucion-desplazados/144198-3.aspx. 
 148. See Colombia no será la misma, supra note 16. 
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problems with institutional organization and noncompliance are 
undermining attempts to provide displacement victims with aid and to 
resolve the displacement problem. Local government bodies are not 
adequately formulating required plans for addressing the needs of the 
displaced.
149
 The national government is not providing the local 
government bodies with adequate support,
150
 nor is it taking adequate 
measures to coordinate and ensure local efforts are carried out properly.
151
 
Moreover, the Court specifically noted that victims returning to their 
homes need substantial support to restart their lives.
152
 Following these 
factual determinations, the Court issued a series of orders designed to 
ensure that the national government provides effective support, 
coordination, and oversight of local governments.
153
 
IV. THE LEY DE VICTIMAS 
In this section, we will describe in more detail the land restitution 
design that the Ley de Victimas establishes to address the problem of 
restitution in Colombia. According to the final legislation, the Ley de 
Victimas creates a restitution program that generally complies with the 
Pinheiro Principles. Most importantly, the Ley de Victimas establishes a 
judicial presumption that people who transferred property in an area of 
generalized violence did so because of the violence:
154
 a current occupant 
of the property who opposes the restitution claim must prove his or her 
good faith and lack of fault in occupying the land.
155
 Those eligible for 
restitution under the terms of the Ley include anyone deprived of property 
rights by an illegal, armed group since 1991.
156
 Eligibility for the favorable 
burden of proof under the Ley de Victimas is limited to those people who 
lost their property, possession, or occupation rights
157
 as a direct or 
 
 
 149. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], diciembre 10, 2010, A.S. 383, Sala 
Especial de Seguimiento a la Sentencia T-025 de 2004 (pt. V, sec. 1.4) (Colom.). 
 150. Id. sec. 2.7 at 27. 
 151. Id. sec. 3.11 at 39. 
 152. Id. sec. 6.3 at 52. 
 153. See id. secs. 9.1–9.6 at 79–89. 
 154. Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 77–78 
 (Colom.) 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. art. 75; cf. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 13 (extending eligibility for restitution to 
claims originating since 1980). 
 157. See Ley de Victimas art. 74 (omitting tenancy rights). The final version of the Ley de 
Victimas eliminated eligibility for those who lost tenancy rights, which was included in earlier drafts. 
The Ley de Victimas has mechanisms to prevent abuse of the favorable burden of proof. The Ley 
makes it a crime with a penalty of eight to twelve years in prison to add a fraudulent record to the 
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indirect consequence of international humanitarian law violations or grave 
and manifest violations of international human rights law.
158
  
Restitution under the Ley de Victimas will occur through a specialized 
judicial process.
159
 To apply for restitution under this process, a 
dispossessed person must add their lost property rights to the Registro de 
Tierras Despojadas (Registry of Dispossessed Lands) (―Registro‖).160 
Restitution will then proceeds through an administrative agency, the 
Unidad Administrativa Especial de Gestión de Tierras Despojadas 
(Special Administrative Unit for the Management of Dispossessed Lands) 
(―Unidad Administrativa‖),161 which will oversee the Registro and submit 
the entries to a judge with specialized experience in restitution 
proceedings. In the absence of such a judge, any judge with original 
jurisdiction may hear the case.
162
 A person who adds their property rights 
to the Registro also will have the ability to submit their claim to a judge 
independently of the Unidad Administrativa.
163
 
The judges will carry out the central task of the restitution program: 
determining whether a particular property can be restored despite opposing 
claims of good faith property rights, and if not, what alternative remedy is 
warranted.
164
 The judicial proceedings are intended to be efficient and 
short, with less than four months between application and judgment.
165
 
The presiding judge is supposed to resolve all claims about land titles, 
even when the dispossession did not follow a standard pattern.
166 
When 
 
 
Registro, and a crime with a penalty of ten to twenty years in prison for a public servant to act on a 
record he knows to be fraudulent. Ley de Victimas, art. 120. The Ley makes it a crime with similar 
penalties to present a fraudulent application for land restitution before a court. Id. 
 158. Id. arts. 3, 75. The earlier Programa Julio restitution design was less explicit about the 
favorable procedural consequences for purported victims of dispossession. Several special principles 
would have applied in restitution proceedings, including a principle of good faith and a principle of 
pro-victim interpretation. The good faith principle would have established that the burden of proof in 
restitution hearings lay with the party opposing restitution, since it required that the victim‘s 
allegations be accepted as true. The pro-victim principle would have established that when the relevant 
law was open to more than one interpretation, the law must be interpreted and applied in the manner 
most favorable for the victim.  
 159. See Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 76–80 
 (Colom.). 
 160. See id. art. 76. 
 161. Id. art. 105. 
 162. See id. arts. 105, 79, 80, 82. 
 163. See id. art. 83. 
 164. See id. arts. 91, 97; cf. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 33–34 (establishing an analogous 
mechanism for contentious restitution proceedings). 
 165. Ley de Victimas art. 91, para. 2; cf. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 40 (establishing that 
the proceedings should not exceed a year). 
 166. See Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 91 
 (Colom.); cf. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 39. 
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granting restitution, the judge should also evaluate any claims for 
compensation made by a good faith secondary owner, possessor, or 
occupant dispossessed as a result.
167
 If the judge decides in favor of 
restitution, then the Unidad Administrativa will typically restore the 
dispossessed property to the claimant.
168
 There is no option for an 
administrative resolution of uncontested restitution claims, unlike under 
the now defunct Programa design.
169 
Under certain circumstances, the judge presiding over the restitution 
proceeding may grant compensation to either the claimant or defendant.
170
 
The Ley de Victimas strictly limits the reasons for granting compensation 
to victims instead of restitution, thereby definitively establishing 
restitution as the preferred remedy for dispossession and reducing the 
financial burden of resolving many cases.
171
 In general, the judge may 
only grant the victim compensation instead of restitution on the victim‘s 
request,
172
 implying that the judge may not force compensation upon a 
victim. The recipient is entitled to one of two different types of 
compensation, monetary compensation or compensation in kind, either of 
which need to be equivalent in value to the original property lost.
173
 First, 
a victim may receive as compensation in kind a plot of land similar to that 
lost, which the Unidad Administrativa will provide.
174
 Under Ley de 
Victimas, a judge may grant compensation in kind when (1) the land is 
within a zone of risk for natural disasters, (2) when multiple people have 
been dispossessed of the same land, (3) when the legal or material 
restitution of the land would create a risk for the victim or her family, or 
(4) when the land has been completely destroyed.
175
 Second, a defendant 
who succeeds in proving her good faith rights to the land absent any fault 
 
 
 167. Ley de Victimas art. 91; cf. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 41–44. 
 168. See Ley de Victimas art. 100. 
 169. See PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 33. 
 170. See Ley de Victimas arts. 73, 97. 
 171. See id. art. 97 (providing four exceptions to the general rule of providing restitution); cf. 
PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 46. 
 172. Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 97 
 (Colom.); cf. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 46–47 (establishing a similar requirement that 
compensation only be granted on the victim‘s request). 
 173. See Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 97–98 
 (Colom.); PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 47 (establishing an analogous provision for the 
Programa design). 
 174. See Ley de Victimas art. 97. 
 175. Id. The Programa Julio design had similar but slightly different conditions for compensation. 
The judge would have been able to grant compensation when the property was destroyed, a returning 
victim would suffer adverse psychological effects, the property was located in an insecure area, or 
landmines or unexploded munitions were located on the property. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 
48. 
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may be granted monetary compensation from a fund that the Unidad 
Administrativa will administer.
176
 The number of secondary occupants 
with compensation claims is reduced by excluding claims from people 
involved in the original dispossession or who knew about it.
177
  
The Unidad Administrativa will be the primary administrative body 
overseeing restitution, coordinating the various stages of the proceedings 
and transfers of land and compensation.
178
 It will administer the Registro 
de Tierras Despojadas, advance the restitution process, pay compensation 
to secondary occupants and dispossessed persons, and subsidize the 
payment of taxes on restored lands.
179
 It will also oversee the Fondo de la 
Unidad Administrativa (Administrative Unit‘s Fund) (―Fondo‖), which 
will contain the resources necessary to cover the costs of the program, 
including compensation.
180
 Resources for the Fondo will come from the 
national budget, public and private donations, other ministries, from goods 
confiscated (via extinción de dominio) by the Dirección Nacional de 
Estupefacientes (National Drug Board), and from similar sources.
181
 The 
Unidad Administrativa will not oversee the return process nor any support 
programs for returning victims, apart from those granting victims 
subsidies for taxes and other debts encumbering a restored property.
182
  
In a gesture toward improving the social effects of land restitution, the 
Ley de Victimas has two important provisions. First, the restored land 
rights are protected by making it impossible to transfer those rights for two 
years, except through inheritance, without the authorization of the court 
that granted the restitution.
183
 Second, the Ley de Victimas creates a special 
attention program for female victims of dispossession to ensure their 
access to restitution.
184
 The program consists of priority consideration of 
land restitution applications by female heads of families,
185
 priority in 
receiving a number of previously granted social benefits,
186
 and 
 
 
 176. Ley de Victimas art. 98. 
 177. See id. arts. 88, 98; cf. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 40 (excluding from compensation 
those secondary occupants who do not substantially rely on the land as well). 
 178. See Ley de Victimas art. 105. 
 179. See Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 105 
 (Colom.) 
 180. Id. arts. 111, 112. 
 181. Id. art. 113. 
 182. See id. art. 105.  
 183. Id. art. 101. 
 184. Id. art. 114. 
 185. Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 115 
 (Colom.). 
 186. Id. art. 117. 
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entitlement to receive joint restitution of land along with husbands,
187
 
presumably even when only he held legal title prior to dispossession. 
While not part of the restitution effort, the Ley de Victimas does 
establish several complementary social programs for all victims of the 
armed conflict. It creates separately administered means of housing 
restitution for those victims who lost their housing by allowing victims 
who lost their housing to apply to the Subsidio Familiar de Vivienda 
(Family Housing Subsidy), which is funded by the Fondo Nacional de 
Vivienda (National Housing Fund) for urban housing and the Banco 
Agrario (Agrarian Bank) for rural housing.
188
 The Ley de Victimas also 
provides access to various health services for all victims of the conflict.
189
 
Additionally, it grants victims support for payment of taxes and other 
debts encumbering a restored property
190
 as well as access to programs to 
aid with obtaining credit.
191
 These resources are helpful because such 
liabilities encumbering property have been used to dispossess a victim 
who was forced to flee his or her property because of violence.
192
 Finally, 
it provides some support for education and professional development; 
victims will have guaranteed access to basic education as well as higher 
education institutions are instructed to facilitate victim access.
193
 Victims 
also have priority access to programs sponsored by the institution for the 
professional development of the Colombian workforce, or SENA.
194
 
Additionally, they have preferential access to government employment.
195
 
By comparison, the now defunct Programa design also would have 
created programs for the economic development of returning people,
196
 
including job training,
197
 support for developing professional 
 
 
 187. Id. arts. 91 ¶ 4, 118. 
 188. Id. arts. 123–27; Subsidio Familiar de Vivienda de Interés Social Urbana, MINISTERIO DE 
AMBIENTE, VIVIENDA Y DESARROLLO TERRITORIAL, http://www.minambiente.gov.co/contenido/ 
contenido.aspx?catID=549&conID=1591 (last visited June 13, 2011). 
 189. See Ley de Victimas arts. 52–54; cf. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 58 (establishing 
health services for returning victims of dispossession). 
 190. Ley de Victimas art. 121; cf. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 67–72 (discussing a 
subprogram for Alleviating Debt Encumbrances); id. at 73–75 (discussing a subprogram for Clearing 
Property Titles). 
 191. Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 128–29 
 (Colom.). 
 192. Linea de Investigación Tierra y Conflicto, supra note 3, at 52. 
 193. Ley de Victimas art. 51; cf. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 58 (establishing education 
access for returning victims of dispossession). 
 194. Ley de Victimas art. 130. 
 195. Id. art. 131. 
 196. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 59–60. 
 197. Id. at 60–61. 
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associations,
198
 grants or loans for vocational projects,
199
 and priority 
access to INCODER land grants.
200
  
Beyond the components of the restitution program itself, the Ley de 
Victimas establishes several institutions that will coordinate and oversee 
the effort to aid all victims of the Colombian armed conflict. The Sistema 
Nacional de Atención y Reparación Integral a las Victimas (National 
System for Comprehensive Attention and Reparation for Victims)
201
 is 
comprised of the Comité Ejecutivo para la Atención y Reparación a las 
Victimas (Executive Committee for Attention and Reparation for Victims) 
(―Comité Ejecutivo‖)202 and the Unidad Administrativa Especial para la 
Atención y Reparación Integral a las Victimas (Special Administrative 
Unit for Comprehensive Attention and Reparation for Victims) (―Unidad 
Administrativa Especial‖).203 These bodies have split competencies for 
assisting the victims of the armed conflict: the Comité Ejecutivo is a 
centralized body primarily responsible for large scale planning,
204
 while 
the Unidad Administrativa Especial is primarily responsible for the 
decentralized implementation of programs for the victims.
205
 The 
hierarchy and lines of responsibility for these institutions within the 
overall program are not specified,
206
 nor is their relationship to the 
restitution process and the Unidad Administrativa,
207
 leaving unclear what 
relationship the Ley de Victimas establishes among these institutions. 
V. COMPLIANCE WITH THE PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES 
While largely in compliance with the Pinheiro Principles, the Ley de 
Victimas has features that may conflict with the requirements of the 
Pinheiro Principles. First, the Ley de Victimas excludes restitution claims 
 
 
 198. Id. at 61. 
 199. Id. at 64–65. 
 200. Id. at 66. 
 201. See Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 162 
(Colom.). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. art. 165. 
 205. Id. arts. 168–69. As opposed to splitting institutional competence between planning and 
implementation, the Programa design would have split institutional competence between 
administering the restitution procedure and administering the execution of judicial decisions and return 
of victims. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 91–95. The later institution would also have been 
responsible for inter-institutional coordination, both with state and civil society organizations. Id. at 
91–93. Additionally, the Programa would not have created separate bodies for victim attention and for 
restitution, as it was only a restitution program.  
 206. See Ley de Victimas arts. 165, 169. 
 207. See id. 
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for victims whose rights the conflict affected before 1991.
208
 Second, the 
design limits restitution claims to real property, exempting potentially 
sizable claims for personal property from the program.
209
 Third, the Ley de 
Victimas restores joint title to couples.
210
 Fourth, the Ley allows victims to 
receive compensation instead of restitution under certain conditions but 
otherwise limits claims for compensation. In this section, we will explain 
how the relevant provisions of the Pinheiro Principles should be 
interpreted and argue that the Ley de Victimas probably complies with the 
Principles.  
First, the Pinheiro Principles probably allow a restitution program to 
exclude claims based on the age of the claim, so long as the limitation is 
not arbitrary. Principle 2.1 does not seem to permit a program to bar older 
claims: ―[a]ll refugees and displaced persons have the right‖ to restitution 
or compensation.
211
 They do not announce any limit on the time in which a 
person dispossessed may claim restitution. However, the official guide to 
implementing the Pinheiro Principles speaks favorably of the wide range 
of time limitations that different restitution programs have imposed on 
restitution claims.
212
 As a result of both how the official guide interprets 
the Pinheiro Principles and the fact that most restitution programs have 
had to impose time limits on claims, the Pinheiro Principles should be 
understood to exclude arbitrary time limits on claims.
213
 
The Ley de Victimas probably does not arbitrarily exclude claims for 
restitution based on the age of a claim when that dispossession had to 
occur in 1991 or later to qualify for restitution.
214
 Although there has been 
some dispute on the matter,
215
 the initial date might not be arbitrary 
because the cutoff coincides with a number of significant political events 
that immediately preceded the current period of massive displacement. In 
1991, the country adopted a new Constitution and completed the 
 
 
 208. Id. art. 75. But see id. art. 3 (granting access to general victim assistance and reparation 
programs for claims originating in 1985 or later). 
 209. Id. art. 72; PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 12. 
 210. Ley de Victimas arts. 91 para. 4, 118. 
 211. THE PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, princ. 2.1. 
 212. See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE AGENCY OF THE UN (FOA) ET AL., HANDBOOK ON HOUSING 
AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS: IMPLEMENTING THE 
‗PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES‘ 27 (2007) [hereinafter HANDBOOK], available at http://www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/docid/4693432c2.html (providing guidelines to implement the Pinheiro Principles created as 
a result of a collaborative effort among many UN organizations and other NGOs). 
 213. See id. 
 214. Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 75 
 (Colom.). 
 215. But see Rodrigo Uprimny, Reparar las victimas, ¿desde qué fecha?, LA SILLA VACÍA (Jan. 
19, 2011), http://www.lasillavacia.com/elblogueo/dejusticia/21142/reparar-victimas-desde-que-fecha.  
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demobilization of the M-19 guerrilla group, marking the start of a new 
phase of the Colombian civil conflict.
216
 Additionally, in 1991 the 
precursors to the main paramilitary group responsible for forced 
displacement, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense 
Forces of Colombia) (―AUC‖), had not yet come into existence.217 Finally, 
the vast majority of land dispossession occurred after 1991.
218
 As there are 
some grounds for selecting 1991 as the maximum age of restitution 
claims, rendering the limitation non-arbitrary,
219
 the Ley de Victimas is 
probably compatible with the Pinheiro Principles on this point.
220
 
However, a claim that the year is not arbitrary is weakened by the fact that 
Ley de Victimas grants assistance and reparations to all those victimized in 
1985 or later
221
 and, therefore, restricting only restitution, and not all 
victim support programs, to persons dispossessed since 1991.
222
 Thus, it 
might be debatable whether the cutoff for claims is consistent with the 
Pinheiro Principles. 
Second, the Principles are unclear as to when restitution must respect 
joint ownership rights of male and female heads of households. Principle 
4.2 states that restitution programs should ―recognise the joint ownership 
rights of both male and female heads of the household . . . .‖223 However, 
the text here is ambiguous. It could mean that even when the male head of 
household held sole rights to property prior to restitution, property should 
be restored to both. Or it could mean that when a female head of 
household held joint rights to the property prior to restitution, the property 
should be restored to both. The second interpretation is much weaker, 
simply amounting to a requirement of procedural equality: restitution 
 
 
 216. See La Constitución del 91, el Mejor Legado del M-19, EL ESPECTADOR (Apr. 24, 2010), 
http://www.elespectador.com/impreso/politica/articuloimpreso199833-constitucion-del-91-el-mejor-
legado-del-m-19. 
 217. See Inter-Am. Comm‘n H.R., supra note 54, ¶¶ 42, 47. 
 218. COMISIÓN DE SEGUIMIENTO, supra note 6, at 9 (reporting that 1,023,703 hectares were 
abandoned, sold, or transferred to third parties between 1980 and 1997; 5,263,282 hectares between 
1998 and 2008; and 351,210 hectares between 2009 and July, 2010). 
 219. Although the time limits may not be arbitrary given the recent Colombian history that 
produced much of the dispossession, this fact should not be taken to extinguish claims of victims from 
prior periods of displacement and dispossession. 
 220. As a point of contrast, the Programa set the cutoff at 1980, a choice that also probably was 
not arbitrary, since the current Colombian displacement and dispossession crisis primarily resulted 
from violence that escalated from the mid-1980s onward. See RODRÍGUEZ & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 1, 
at 67–68; Ibáñez & Muñoz, supra note 1, at 5–9 (admitting all claims after 1980 would ensure that all 
claims from this cycle of violence were covered by the restitution program).  
 221. Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 3 
 (Colom.). 
 222. Id. art. 75. 
 223. THE PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, princ. 4.2. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
32 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 11:1 
 
 
 
 
programs must respect the property rights of women as well as men. The 
first interpretation would require an attempt to transform the unjust or 
unequal situation of property rights that existed prior to dispossession.  
However, the official guide says that the 
provision is meant to combat sex discrimination which may occur 
when only male ‗heads of households‘ are informally recognized as 
rights holders or when they are provided with formal title to housing 
or other property ownership rights, leaving women without legal 
control over what should also be treated as their property.
224
  
This interpretation implies that the requirement is designed to prevent 
restitution programs from assuming that only male heads of households 
held property rights, particularly when the property rights were held 
informally without formal title or registration. In particular, Principle 4.2 
prevents restitution programs from automatically denying women property 
rights when they have a spouse or permanent companion.
225
 That is, the 
principle seeks to ensure that women enjoy equal rights to hold property, 
not necessarily to promote equal holdings between men and women that 
jointly own the property.
226
  
Unlike the now defunct Programa, the Ley de Victimas exceeds the 
demands of the Pinheiro Principles on this point since it requires that title 
be jointly restored to a claimant and his or her permanent companion or 
spouse.
227
 Given that the Pinheiro Principles simply require that a woman 
is not automatically excluded from receiving title because she has a spouse 
or permanent companion, the Ley de Victimas satisfies the requirement. 
Even if the Pinheiro Principles demand more than this minimum, the Ley 
de Victimas almost certainly satisfies whatever further requirement the 
principles impose. In contrast, the analogous provision from the now 
defunct Programa, while exceptionally vague, neither would have 
required universal joint restitution of title,
228
 nor would it have established 
a general presumption that female spouses or permanent companions 
always lacked property rights to the land they jointly occupied prior to 
 
 
 224. HANDBOOK, supra note 212, at 36. 
 225. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 46. 
 226. See U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights, Explanatory Notes on the Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for 
Refugees and Displaced Persons ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17/Add.1 (2005). However, a 
principle requiring equal formal rights to hold property might require joint restitution to male and 
female heads of households under some conditions.  
 227. Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 91 para. 4, 
118 (Colom.). 
 228. See generally PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13. 
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dispossession.
229
 Consequently, Programa might have also complied with 
the basic Pinheiro Principles requirement that women have the equal right 
to hold property and recover lost property, but the Ley de Victimas clearly 
surpasses both in furthering gender equality.  
Third, the conditions under which restitution programs may provide 
compensation instead of restitution are complicated. The Pinheiro 
Principles assert that ―[s]tates shall, in order to comply with the principle 
of restorative justice, ensure that the remedy of compensation is only used 
when the remedy of restitution is not factually possible, or when the 
injured party knowingly and voluntarily accepts compensation in lieu of 
restitution.‖230 Restitution is only impossible when the property in 
question has been destroyed or no longer exists.
231
 However, the 
implementation guide says that it is also factually impossible to restore 
property when it has been physically damaged or when restitution would 
carry with it a substantial social cost, such as the destruction of a 
factory.
232
 As a result, the requirement is not as strong as it may first 
appear: property is factually impossible to restore when there is some 
weighty consideration militating against restitution, such as a factory with 
substantial social value. Even so, it is clear, according to all the 
interpretative materials of the Pinheiro Principles, that a restitution 
program may only provide compensation instead of restitution when the 
victim voluntarily chooses compensation.
233
  
The Ley de Victimas seems consistent with the Pinheiro Principles 
regarding the circumstances under which compensation may be granted 
instead of restitution. Before compensation is granted instead of 
restitution, the Ley de Victimas actually requires that victims meet both of 
the requirements in the Pinheiro Principles: the victim consents and 
restitution is difficult or carries a significant cost. The compensation that 
the Ley de Victimas permits is always granted in accordance with the 
principle of victim‘s consent since the claimant must apply for 
compensation instead of restitution.
234
 Additionally, each of the conditions 
under which a victim can claim compensation under the Ley de Victimas 
meets the requirement of the Pinheiro Principles since the principles 
accept that a substantial social cost is sufficient to make restitution 
 
 
 229. See generally id. 
 230. THE PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, princ. 21.1. 
 231. Id. princ. 21.2. 
 232. HANDBOOK, supra note 212, at 25–26. 
 233. Id. at 25; U.N. Commission on Human Rights, supra note 226, ¶ 70. 
 234. Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 97 
 (Colom.). 
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factually impossible.
235
 First, the claimant may apply for compensation 
when the land is in an area with a high risk of natural disaster or 
violence.
236
 Second, a claimant may request compensation when it is 
factually impossible to restore the land, such as when it has been destroyed 
or when there are multiple claimants for the same land.
237
  
Although the Ley de Victimas limits the conditions under which a 
victim can request and receive compensation, it does not violate the 
Pinheiro Principles on this point. The Ley de Victimas requires that the 
victim voluntarily apply for compensation instead of restitution,
238
 making 
all of its conditions for compensation limits on eligibility for 
compensation rather than for restitution. That is, these conditions limit the 
circumstances under which a victim can request that the state provide 
compensation instead of restitution. When a victim does not choose to 
apply for compensation instead of restitution, the Ley de Victimas does not 
imply that he or she will ever be forced to do so.
239
 Since the Pinheiro 
Principles do not impose extensive requirements on the conditions under 
which compensation must be offered, it is unlikely that the program design 
violates the Pinheiro Principles in sharply limiting the availability of 
compensation. 
Finally, when the Pinheiro Principles state that IDPs have the right to 
restitution of property, they are most plausibly referring only to real 
property, not to personal property.
240
 The Pinheiro Principles almost 
always discuss property along with housing and land, referring to them as 
―housing, land and/or property . . . .‖241 Given that property rights in 
housing and land are rights to real property, the Pinheiro Principles are 
naturally read as referring to real property when they use the word 
―property‖ in this context. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that 
the Pinheiro Principles require that states establish registration systems for 
housing, land, and property.
242
 Since registration systems are primarily 
used for real property, it appears that property is limited to real property. 
 
 
 235. The Programa would have complied with the Pinheiro Principles on this point as well, as it 
would have permitted compensation instead of restitution only when the property to be restored was 
destroyed, return would have adverse psychological effects for the victim, the property was located in 
an insecure area, or landmines or unexploded munitions were located on the property. PROGRAMA 
JULIO, supra note 13, at 46. 
 236. Ley de Victimas art. 97(a), (c). 
 237. Id. art. 97(b), (d). 
 238. See id. art. 97; cf. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 46–47. 
 239. See Ley de Victimas art. 97.  
 240. THE PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, princ. 2.1. 
 241. E.g., id. 
 242. THE PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, princ. 15.1. 
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Finally, the Explanatory Notes, an addendum to the Pinheiro Principles 
submitted by Sergio Pinheiro, explicitly state that ―‗[p]roperty‘ within the 
context of the Principles refers primarily to real and/or immovable 
property . . . .‖243 Consequently, the fact that the restitution program 
established by the Ley de Victimas limits restitution to land and housing 
does not result in a significant conflict with the Pinheiro Principles.
244
 
The Ley de Victimas broadly complies with the Pinheiro Principles on 
the main points of potential discrepancy. Any actual deviations between 
the requirements are minor and unlikely to affect the conclusions we wish 
to draw about the implementation of return through restitution under Ley 
de Victimas in accord with the Pinheiro Principles.  
VI. LAND RESTITUTION AND RETURN 
The Ley de Victimas program design separates the right to restitution 
from return since it does not require that a victim return in order to receive 
restitution.
245
 However, we will argue that the Ley de Victimas could better 
balance victim choice with the need to promote return if it included more 
substantial support programs specifically aimed at returning victims. The 
Ley de Victimas motivates return by limiting the transfer of restored land 
and by providing some return programs, but limiting the transfer of 
restored land interferes with victim choice, while the support programs 
offered can be taken advantage of without return. For these reasons, the 
Ley de Victimas strikes a less than optimal choice between victim choice 
and motivating return. 
The decision to require or not to require return in order to receive 
restitution is a complicated one. On the one hand, the victims are 
presumptively entitled to possess their legal property holdings regardless 
of whether or not they return to the land. This idea is fundamental to the 
notion of property and is thoroughly embedded in Colombian domestic 
law
246
 and in international law.
247
 On the other hand, granting restitution of 
 
 
 243. U.N. Commission on Human Rights, supra note 226, ¶ 30. 
 244. Colombian law does define some property other than housing and land as real property. See 
CÓD. CIV., arts. 657–59 (Colom.). 
 245. See Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 72 
(Colom.). 
 246. See generally COD. CIV., Libro Segundo Titulo XII (Colom.) (establishing the primary 
private law remedy for the equivalent of conversion). 
 247. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 17, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., 
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Protocol 1, March 20, 1952, art. 1 (European Convention on Human Rights); 
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. 
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land or monetary compensation to victims who will not return, as may be 
the case for most Colombian victims,
248
 creates significant problems. A 
program providing restitution or compensation for the dispossession of 
land is commonly intended to resolve a displacement crisis. However, the 
financial support for non-returning displaced persons obtained from 
selling returned property, or from monetary compensation, may only 
temporarily support them unless underlying problems of displacement are 
resolved, particularly if displaced persons are likely to have persistent 
trouble with adapting to their post-displacement conditions.
249
 
Additionally, when victims receive restitution of land but do not intend to 
return, they are likely to sell their land, potentially consolidating or 
worsening the unequal distribution of land in rural Colombia and 
perpetuating the agrarian counter-reform.  
The Ley de Victimas does not adequately reconcile the need to ensure 
victim choice with the need to promote return. While the Ley de Victimas 
does not require a victim to return in order to receive restitution,
250
 it 
significantly constrains the options a victim has if she is going to receive 
benefits from the program. The Ley de Victimas strictly limits the 
conditions under which a victim can obtain compensation instead of 
restitution, permitting compensation only if the land in question is 
destroyed, overly dangerous, or subject to multiple claimants.
251
 
Moreover, a victim that successfully petitions for compensation will only 
receive compensation in the form of equivalent land, not in the form of 
monetary compensation that might help her establish a normal life in her 
current location.
252
 As a result, many, if not most, victims of dispossession 
 
 
No.36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 art. 21. 
 248. COMISIÓN DE SEGUIMIENTO A LA POLÍTICA PÚBLICA SOBRE DESPLAZAMIENTO FORZADO, 
Tercer Informe de Verificación sobre el Cumplimiento de Derechos de la Población en Situación de 
Desplazamiento, 39, 41 (Dec. 2010) (reporting that only 5.8% of IDPs want to return to their place of 
origins, with 34.9% not wanting to return out of fear and an additional 12.7% because they believe that 
the conditions leading to displacement persist). 
 249. Consumption for displaced households is lower a year after displacement than in the first 
three months following displacement, possibly because savings and humanitarian aid are exhausted. 
See Ana María Ibáñez & Andrés Moya, ¿Cómo el Desplazamiento Forzado Deteriora el Bienestar de 
los Hogares Desplazados?: Análisis y Determinantes del Bienestar en los Municipios de Recepción, 
11 (2006) (unpublished), http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/content/download/2137/12755/file/d2006-
26.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). Additionally, part of the problem that confronts displaced 
agricultural workers is a lack of demand for their skills, making it difficult to adapt to the new 
economic conditions. See id. at 13. 
 250. See Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 71–75 
 (Colom.). 
 251. Id. art. 97. 
 252. Id. 
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will be required to leave their current locations in order to take advantage 
of restitution or compensation from the Ley de Victimas. 
At first glance, the exceptions based on various dangerous conditions 
reflect the principal reason why victims do not wish to return: fear of 
further violence and re-victimization.
253
 However, this fear is not the only 
reason why victims do not want to return. Many victims do not want to 
return because return would involve giving up opportunities for social 
advancement and social services,
254
 often in a city with quite different 
conditions of life and livelihood than in the rural settings from which they 
came.
255
 For victims that have been living for many years in conditions of 
poverty in a city or other circumstances different from their place of 
origin, it may be preferable to receive monetary compensation or to 
receive other assistance where they are currently located. Such 
compensation would allow them to avoid further disruption to their lives 
while improving the lives that they have built in their new location.  
The Ley de Victimas adds another requirement that particularly restricts 
victim choice in the context of a strict requirement of restitution: the 
victim cannot transfer the property rights to the restored land for two years 
without the ―prior, express and motivated authorization‖ of the presiding 
court.
256
 While the requirement is an important step toward preventing 
recurrences of forced land transfers,
257
 it also has the side effect of 
preventing a victim who receives restitution from easily selling the 
restored land in ordered to finance his or her resettlement in a preferred 
area, such as a city. Obtaining court authorization may prove challenging 
because poor victims from rural areas may face substantial barriers to 
access the judicial system. Moreover, it does not explain what would 
constitute ―motivated authorization.‖ In combination with the strict limits 
on compensation, this restriction on transfer of restored land provides 
some incentive for victims to return to their place of origin since they 
cannot obtain meaningful benefits from the program otherwise, at least in 
the short-term.  
 
 
 253. See Comisión de Seguimiento, supra note 248, at 54 (reporting that 58% of victims who do 
not want to return because of fear, a belief that the conditions that led to the original displacement 
persist, or a lack of a place to which they can return). 
 254. See id. at 41. 
 255. Id.  
 256. See Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 101 
(Colom.). 
 257. The requirement echoes an initiative to prevent coerced land transfers. See Decree 2007/01, 
septiembre 24, 2001, art. 4 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.). 
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The provisions for economic and social programs explicitly contained 
in the Ley de Victimas are unlikely to motivate return because they are not 
specifically aimed at supporting returning victims and, in fact, may be 
more accessible in the location of displacement. The Ley de Victimas does 
grant the national government the authority to implement a new rural 
development policy that prioritizes victims, but the terms of this policy 
have yet to be decided.
258
 The basic problem is that the social and 
economic programs explicitly created by the Ley de Victimas are targeted 
at victims generally and not at the needs of returnees specifically.
259
 The 
likely consequence of the broader targeting is that the programs will be 
available where the dispossessed and other victims are currently located, 
predominantly in the cities, and less accessible in the predominately rural 
areas to which the dispossessed in particular might return.
260
 Additionally, 
the broad focus on all victims of the conflict with no specific emphasis on 
returning dispossessed victims will likely result in a lack of attention to the 
particular needs of returning victims. For example, the Ley de Victimas 
does not prioritize land grants from INCODER or loans for purchasing 
farm equipment, nor does it facilitate the formation of professional 
organizations, all of which are steps that the Programa would have taken 
to address the unique needs of returning victims.
261
 As a result, the 
motivation to return that the Ley de Victimas provides is largely limited to 
the fact that a victim of dispossession would have difficulty taking 
advantage of the restitution program absent return. 
The Ley de Victimas has two features that could potentially motivate 
victims to return to their places of origins: (1) restrictions on compensation 
and transfer of restored land, and (2) secondary programs that benefit 
victims. First, the Ley de Victimas only permits a victim to obtain 
compensation instead of restitution under limited circumstances and 
restricts the transfer of land restored through the program.
262
 While these 
features should encourage victims to return, since they make actual return 
the easiest way to benefit from the program, they do so by sacrificing 
victim choice. A victim will not be able to both benefit from the program 
and chose to remain in the location of displacement. Additionally, even if 
victims can only effectively obtain benefits from the restitution program 
 
 
 258. Ley de Victimas, art. 206. 
 259. See, e.g., id. arts. 51–59. 
 260. See SNAIPD, supra note 4, at 86 (reporting that most victims are from rural areas). 
 261. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 57, 65. 
 262. Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 97, 101 
 (Colom.). 
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by returning to their homes, this may be insufficient to motivate large-
scale return: victims are primarily hesitant to return because of fear that 
they will be displaced and dispossessed again.
263
  
Second, the Ley de Victimas creates several social programs to benefit 
victims of the armed conflict. The creation of these programs could 
motivate victims to return by establishing a meaningful government 
commitment to improve victims‘ lives. This symbolic effect may help 
overcome the reluctance of victims to return for fear of continued 
insecurity and the possibility of re-victimization.
264
 These programs could 
also motivate victims to return if they were aimed at helping returning 
victims reestablish themselves in their old homes and land. However, the 
use of secondary programs is not tied to actual return, as they are not 
directed at victims of dispossession in particular but rather to all victims of 
the armed conflict. While they may provide support for returning victims, 
these programs will not motivate return in the way they would if actual 
return were necessary to receive benefits from them. The Ley de Victimas 
could be a greater success in this dimension if the national government 
uses the authority granted to implement a robust rural development policy 
with a focus on the needs and interests of returning victims.
265
 
Achieving an adequate balance between protecting victim choice and 
promoting return may require significant secondary programs that provide 
an incentive for victims to return. Without these incentives, the only way 
to encourage return is to limit the benefits of the restitution program to 
those who do return, either by preventing the transfer of restored land or 
by requiring return to receive restitution. Even with this incentive, victims 
still may be unlikely to return out of fear or other concerns. Implementing 
restitution and return satisfactorily under the terms of the Pinheiro 
Principles will require secondary programs that make return both possible 
and desirable. 
VII. ADMINISTERING LAND RESTITUTION 
The effective administration of restitution and return faces three main 
challenges: (1) ensuring access to the restitution procedure, (2) applying 
the procedure fairly and consistently, and (3) coordinating assistance for 
those who return to their land following restitution. We will argue in this 
section that centralized administration is necessary to meet these 
 
 
 263. See COMISIÓN DE SEGUIMIENTO, supra note 248, at 54. 
 264. Id. 
 265. See Ley de Victimas, art. 206. 
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challenges to implementing return within the bounds of the Pinheiro 
Principles. 
The Ley de Victimas faces substantial challenges in achieving 
procedural fairness, both in ensuring equal access to the restitution 
proceedings and in ensuring consistent judgments. The Unidad 
Administrativa’s centralized control of applications for restitution is 
potentially a significant aid in ensuring equal access to the restitution 
process, particularly if the Unidad Administrativa is managed correctly. 
The Unidad Administrativa will accept registrations of land in the registry 
of dispossessed property and oversee their submission to judges for 
restitution awards.
266
 As other restitution efforts have demonstrated, strong 
central coordination and control of local restitution efforts can overcome 
even the considerable barriers to victim access posed by reticent local 
authorities.
267
 By giving a central body the authority to oversee local 
authorities, as the Programa would have also done,
268
 a restitution 
program may well be able to effectively monitor and address problems of 
unequal victim access to restitution proceedings.  
The primary barrier to equality of access is the fact that the victims are 
spread throughout the country, probably requiring that the restitution 
program rely on local bodies to publicize the procedures and, potentially, 
to transmit registrations to the Unidad Administrativa. Local government 
resistance has been a general problem for providing assistance to 
 
 
 266. See id. art. 105. 
 267. The property restitution process in Bosnia-Herzegovina was initially plagued by significant 
problems with victim access to restitution procedures. International organizations centrally 
administered the program in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but local governments and agencies were in charge 
of receiving restitution requests from victims and carrying out certain parts of the restitution process. 
However, the local governments and agencies generally tried to obstruct the restitution process 
through delays, improper denials, and failure to publicize, presumably largely due to remaining ethnic 
tensions following the Bosnian War (1992–1995). These obstructions resulted in substantial problems 
for victim access to restitution. Charles Philpott, Though the Dog is Dead, the Pig must be Killed: 
Finishing with Property Restitution to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s IDPs and Refugees, 18 J. REFUGEE 
STUD. 1, 4 (2005). Despite these initial problems posed by continuing ethnic tensions, the program 
eventually succeeded in providing restitution to the vast majority of victims following the creation of 
the Property Law Implementation Plan. International organizations responded to obstruction by local 
authorities with aggressive legal measures and also launched a massive information campaign to 
inform citizens of their legal right to restitution. Id.; see also Lynn Hastings, Implementation of the 
Property Legislation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 37 STAN. J. INT‘L L. 221, 231 (2001).  
 The Colombian program faces different problems including equal access and fairness of judgment 
complicated by geography and education more than deliberate political obstruction. However, the 
Bosnian example demonstrates that if the Unidad Administrativa is active and aggressive in addressing 
local problems of victim access, particularly when problems result from a lack of communication with 
victims, it should be able to use its position to facilitate victim access to restitution. 
 268. Of course, whether the Unidad Administrativa will effectively play this role depends to a 
large degree on its actual implementation, including its competence and good faith. 
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displacement victims, blocking both plans and implementation of 
assistance.
269
 Neither the Unidad Administrativa nor any one of the new 
institutions has clear and direct authority over the local bodies that are 
instrumental to ensuring access to the restitution process,
270
 and the 
relevant authority that may exist is in the hands of both the Comité 
Ejecutivo and the Unidad Administrativa Especial,
271
 thereby splitting 
oversight of the restitution process between these institutions and the 
Unidad Administrativa. This division of oversight creates a substantial 
barrier to ensuring access for all victims, let alone the equality of access 
that probably can only be achieved through a combination of publicity 
efforts and application procedures.
272
  
The adjudicative procedures that the Ley de Victimas establishes for 
restitution also face substantial challenges to achieving consistent 
judgments. Restitution judgments are less susceptible than reparation 
judgments to being unequal or unfair, since the actual land lost sets a 
concrete and objective scale for the size of a judgment, while the value of 
a personal injury of concern in a reparations judgment is inherently 
subjective. However, despite the objective scale for valuation, restitution 
judgments may also be inconsistent due to disparities in factual findings 
and in the application of the law.  
The Ley de Victimas in particular is susceptible to such difficulties in 
the application of the presumption in favor of the victim. First, different 
court proceedings may reach different judgments on the facts necessary to 
establish the presumption, in particular whether a particular property was 
affected by violence.
273
 These judgments will typically be relevant in more 
than one proceeding because they concern endemic violence that can 
affect more than one person. Second, different court proceedings may 
apply the presumption more or less strictly by requiring secondary 
occupants to prove their good faith without fault according to different 
standards.
274
 The Ley de Victimas perhaps accentuates these consistency 
 
 
 269. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court] diciembre 10, 2010, Auto 383, part V, 
134 sec. 1.4, Sala Especial de Seguimiento a la Sentencia T-025 de 2004 (pp. 23–24) (Colom.). 
 270. See Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 105, 
165, 169 (Colom.). 
 271. See id. arts. 165 para. 7, 168 para. 6. 
 272. Cf. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], diciembre 10, 2010, Auto 383, part V, 
sec. 1.4, 2.7, 3.11 Sala Especial de Seguimiento a la Sentencia T-025 de 2004 (pp. 23–24, 27–28, 39–
40) (Colom.) (recognizing that local government bodies have provided inadequate support for victims 
of displacement, in part because the national government has provided inadequate support and 
coordination). 
 273. See Ley de Victimas, art. 77; cf. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 36–37. 
 274. See Ley de Victimas, art. 77. 
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problems with the particular judicial restitution procedure it establishes: 
(1) it will use local judges, who are notoriously prone to corruption, to 
decide cases individually and not in panels of multiple judges, and (2) 
lacks a rigorous appeal procedure, which could help ensure consistency 
and fairness in judicial decisions.
275
 
While the Unidad Administrativa probably will not be able to mitigate 
these problems, as they are outside of its explicit competency according to 
the Ley de Victimas,
276
 other procedural mechanisms may help to some 
extent. In particular, the Ley de Victimas permits the accumulation of 
processes, or joinder, when various claims concern the same property or 
when the claims concern adjoining or neighboring properties.
277
 Extensive 
and careful use of this mechanism to combine suits that share factual bases 
is likely to make decisions to apply the presumption in favor of the 
dispossessed more consistent. For example, if a particular village suffered 
mass displacement and dispossession, individual suits are likely to share 
factual questions that determine eligibility for the presumption since the 
same violence may have affected all relevant owners. Combining suits 
may also help with equal application of the presumption in certain cases. If 
the property of an entire village ended up in the hands of a single owner, 
consolidating cases may ensure that the same presumption is applied to all 
of the cases. This mechanism, however, does not ensure consistent 
application of the presumption across unrelated cases of dispossession, 
since no single suit could possibly cover the massive dispossession in 
Colombia by different actors during the past twenty years.  
Following a successful restitution suit, the Ley de Victimas is unlikely 
to provide for adequately coordinated support for returning displaced and 
dispossessed persons. While the Ley de Victimas contains a number of 
support mechanisms for victims of the conflict, these mechanisms are not 
targeted at returning victims in particular.
278
 The Ley de Victimas 
contemplates assistance for education,
279
 health,
280
 housing,
281
 and 
professional development,
282
 all of which will be provided through 
existing state institutions. Housing assistance will be provided through the 
 
 
 275. See id. arts. 79, 92. 
 276. Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 105 
 (Colom.). 
 277. Id. art. 95. 
 278. See id. tit. V (―De la Institucionalidad para la Atención y Reparación a las Víctimas . . . .‖).  
 279. See id. art. 51. 
 280. See id. arts. 52–59. 
 281. Id. arts. 123–27. 
 282. Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 130–1 
 (Colom.). 
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Subsidio Familiar de Vivienda,
283
 with subsidies for rural housing 
administered by the Banco Agrario and delivered by local government 
bodies.
284
 The use of local governments and institutions with a rural focus 
may allow returning victims to gain access to these subsidies. In contrast, 
professional training is to be delivered through SENA,
285
 whose locations 
are heavily concentrated in the cities,
286
 making them inaccessible for 
many victims returning to the rural areas. 
Moreover, local governments are unlikely to provide effective aid to 
the returning victims even with the support of the new institutions 
established by the Ley de Victimas. The Constitutional Court has 
recognized that foot-dragging by local government bodies has been a 
recurring problem for effective attention to victims of displacement 
resulting in the failure to even formulate plans for providing services and 
assistance to the displaced, let alone actually providing them.
287
 The 
institutional design in the Ley de Victimas is unlikely to improve this 
situation. While the Ley de Victimas creates a number of new bodies 
aimed at attention to victims of the conflict, it fails to establish a clear 
command hierarchy for attention to victims and clear lines of 
responsibility for failures to improve the situation.
288
  
Finally, the Ley de Victimas creates no single institution that has a 
stated purpose or goal of coordinating support for returning victims.
289
 The 
Unidad Administrativa’s mandate is limited to overseeing the 
administrative process for obtaining restitution.
290
 The rest of the new 
institutions appear to reflect the fact that restitution was originally to be 
handled in a law separate from the Ley de Victimas, as they do not have as 
explicit tasks coordinating victims programs with the restitution and return 
process.
291
 Additionally, the institutions that the Ley de Victimas will 
create have overlapping and unclear lines of hierarchy and 
 
 
 283. Id. art. 123. 
 284. Programa de Vivienda Rural, BANCO AGRARIO, http://www.bancoagrario.gov.co/Vivienda/ 
Paginas/Generalidades.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2011). 
 285. Ley de Victimas art. 130. 
 286. Ubicación y Horarios de Atención, SENA, http://www.sena.edu.co/Portal/El+SENA/Ubicaci 
%C3%B3n+y+horarios+de+atenci%C3%B3n/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
 287. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court] diciembre 10, 2010, Auto 383, part V, 
134 sec. 1.4, Sala Especial de Seguimiento a la Sentencia T-025 de 2004 (pp. 23–24) (Colom.). 
 288. See, e.g., Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 
105, 165, 169 (Colom.). 
 289. See id. arts. 105, 165, 169. 
 290. See id. art. 105. 
 291. See id. arts. 165, 169. 
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responsibility.
292
 This institutional design is likely to result in a lack of 
adequate attention to whether returnees‘ needs are met.  
The administrative structure of a restitution program, however, has the 
potential to mitigate problems with coordinating the programs that support 
the victims returning to their restored land. For example, the Programa 
design called for the creation of two administrative bodies that were 
supposed to coordinate program design and implementation of the 
program across different state organizations as well as with other 
Colombian transitional justice programs.
293
 One body would have had as 
one of its primary tasks coordinating the various institutions involved in 
the Programa,
294
 which would include the institutions assigned the role of 
supporting returning victims. As can be inferred from experiences in other 
land restitution programs, these institutions could have assisted in 
coordination of service delivery under the Programa as well as with 
services provided by the other transitional justice programs.
295
 The 
Programa would have allowed the effort to coordinate geographically 
dispersed agencies to take advantage of the extensive information systems. 
The program design would have established two types of information 
systems that could have provided the means to monitor the overall scope 
and function of the program.
296
 Other restitution processes have shown 
that information systems make it possible to effectively monitor a large-
scale restitution effort under challenging circumstances.
297
  
One final potential issue with the Ley de Victimas is the choice of a 
judicial procedure instead of an administrative one. Judicial restitution 
proceedings suffer from a number of severe limitations in the case of a 
mass restitution program. Most importantly, judicial procedures put the 
 
 
 292. See id. arts. 105, 165, 169. 
 293. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 91–93. 
 294. Id. at 13. 
 295. While the Bosnia-Herzegovina program most clearly demonstrates that central coordination 
can overcome significant barriers to victim access to restitution, it also demonstrates that central 
coordination of individual efforts can overcome significant supervisory problems. See Philpott, supra 
note 267. As a result, it is plausible that central bodies could effectively coordinate restitution and 
return with other transitional justice efforts. 
 296. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 83, 85. 
 297. While the monitoring efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina were less exceptional than the 
coordination efforts, and less extensively discussed as a result, they were able to identify problems 
with victim access to the restitution process as well as the levels of success in securing victim 
restitution. Philpott, supra note 267, at 9 (reporting that following the PLIP, ―the monthly collection 
and publishing of statistics on property restitution for each municipality . . . allowed for easier tracking 
of progress and some limited comparison between municipalities and regions‖); see also Hastings, 
supra note 267, at 234 (reporting that monitoring revealed that less than 50% of victims had registered 
for restitution one month prior to a 1999 deadline). 
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decisions in the hands of autonomous judges less subject to a form of 
central control that could ensure consistency of factual determinations and 
application of standards. Additionally, systems of judicial restitution are 
much slower and more expensive than administrative proceedings.
298
 
Given the large number of potential restitution claims to be evaluated, an 
administrative procedure would be more efficient and more likely to 
ultimately succeed.
299
 However, since the Pinheiro Principles do not 
require a judicial process for restitution,
300
 this highly problematic feature 
of both program designs indicates nothing about the general viability of 
the Pinheiro Principles. 
An analysis of the Ley de Victimas design suggests that the Pinheiro 
Principles can be implemented in a way that circumvents most 
administrative problems, so long as there are strong, central institutions 
coordinating the effort. Institutional development is essential to 
successfully administering a restitution program. To ensure equal access to 
the restitution mechanism, some central body needs to either conduct or 
oversee the local effort. Coordinating support efforts for returning victims 
who have received restitution also requires a central body with authority. 
Since the initial stage, access to restitution, the intermediate stage, the 
judicial process, and the final stage of return, take place in geographically-
disperse locations, the support programs require strong central 
coordination in order to be fair and successful. 
VIII. TRANSFORMING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF RETURN 
A restitution program that aims to return victims to their homes faces 
the challenge of changing the structure of rural agriculture so that victims 
will return to different circumstances than those they were forced to leave. 
We will argue in this section that a restitution program can meet this 
challenge only if it includes programs complementary to restitution. In 
particular, a combination of land grants, training, and loan programs can 
help change the adverse circumstances that victims faced prior to 
displacement. 
While transforming rural agriculture is not an essential requirement of 
a restitution program since an independent land policy reform could 
 
 
 298. See Sánchez & Uprimny, supra note 39, at 254. 
 299. See id. (reporting that restitution efforts in Kosovo and South Africa had to adopt 
administrative elements in response to delays and that many observers felt these changes were 
necessary to address the large number of claims). 
 300. See THE PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, princ. 12.4. 
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accomplish such transformation, many political contexts demand both are 
addressed simultaneously. Implementing a program that fails to transform 
inequality is potentially quite harmful, as doing so can undermine broader 
attempts at land reform. For example, given the historic gaps between 
attempts at substantive agrarian reform in Colombia,
301
 the Ley de 
Victimas will probably be the only reform initiative for many years. It is 
unlikely to be complemented by a more comprehensive land reform 
program aimed at reducing the inequality of rural land distribution in rural 
Colombia. Within the constraints of the Colombian political system, a 
restitution program may be the most that can be hoped for at present, 
making it an attractive policy.
302
 However, a restitution program that does 
not actively seek to transform the inequalities in land distribution is a less 
than satisfactory alternative to full land reform.  
Implementing the Ley de Victimas is unlikely to exacerbate the unequal 
distribution of agricultural land in Colombia. The vast majority of the 
dispossessed in Colombia were peasants,
303
 so the claims are unlikely to 
generally involve large tracts of land the restitution of which could have a 
substantial, negative impact on equality of land distribution. Thus, 
restoring land to small plot farmers is unlikely to exacerbate the unequal 
land distribution and may even improve the land distribution. Likewise, 
returning land to small plot farmers is also unlikely to make a significant 
positive contribution to the equality of land distribution between the 
wealthy and the poor. The Ley only contemplates affecting the land 
distribution by rolling it back to what it was before the mass displacement 
and dispossession. As land had a problematically unequal distribution 
even before the massive transfers of land from the poor to the wealthy 
over the last twenty years, the Ley de Victimas will have a limited affect 
on this problem. 
The Programa design suggested two additional mechanisms with 
which a restitution program could affect the distribution of land across 
socioeconomic classes beyond simply recreating the distribution prior to 
displacement.
304
 First, a restitution program can prioritize restitution based 
on socioeconomic status: the Programa design selected different 
municipalities for restitution in part based on need and poverty-level of the 
 
 
 301. See supra notes 75–81 and accompanying text. 
 302. See Saffon, supra note 46, at 134–36. 
 303. Cf. SNAIPD, supra note 4, at 86 (reporting that according to the RUPD, 90% of displaced 
persons are from rural areas). 
 304. Notably, these measures would also complement programs aimed at assisting returning 
farmers, as they would attempt to increase both the portion of land held by small plot farmers and 
increase the size of the individual holdings. 
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population need.
305
 However, to maintain compatibility with the Pinheiro 
Principles, a program cannot impose any cutoff for restitution claims 
based on a lack of poverty or need,
306
 limiting the effect that the completed 
restitution program would have on wealth distribution. Second, a 
restitution program could give victims priority access to land from 
INCODER,
307
 an action that would allow a program to affect the unequal 
land distribution in Colombia. While the history of land grants and land 
reform in Colombia does not augur well for the success of this sort of 
initiative, in principle, complementing restitution with land grants could 
allow a restitution program to comply with the Pinheiro Principles
308
 while 
also positively affecting the equality of land distribution. Whether a state 
can improve the equality of land distribution through a program that 
complements restitution with land grants depends on whether the state can 
find appropriate land to distribute through the grants.  
The Ley de Victimas is likely to have a positive effect on the gender 
distribution of land in rural Colombia. Every parcel of land restored 
through the mechanisms offered by the Ley de Victimas will be jointly 
titled to the claimant and his or her spouse or permanent companion.
309
 
Since men have substantially larger land holdings in rural Colombia than 
women,
310
 joint restitution should therefore increase the portion of land 
held by women. Although the requirement for joint titling only applies to 
land restored through the mechanisms established by the Ley de 
Victimas,
311
 the favorable terms for restitution proceedings under the Ley 
de Victimas should ensure that few people use other legal procedures to 
avoid joint restitution. This feature of the Ley de Victimas is 
commendable, as the Pinheiro Principles do not require that a restitution 
program address the gender balance of land holdings in this way.
312
 It is 
complemented with features that seek to provide women with special 
support for accessing the restitution process, including priority in 
 
 
 305. See PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 13. 
 306. See id. at 32–39. 
 307. Id. at 65. 
 308. The Pinheiro Principles do not permit the exclusion of dispossessed people from restitution 
on the grounds that they are wealthy or not in need. See THE PINHEIRO PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, 
princ. 3. 
 309. Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 91 para. 4, 
118 (Colom.). 
 310. Carmen Diana Deere & Magdalena Leon, The Gender Asset Gap: Land in Latin America, 31 
WORLD DEVEL. 925, 940 (2003); see ACCIÓN SOCIAL, supra note 121, at 41. 
 311. Ley de Victimas arts. 91 para. 4, 118. 
 312. See PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 32–39. 
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consideration of claims and in obtaining the restitution of land granted in a 
judgment.
313
  
The restitution and return process envisioned by the Ley de Victimas is 
much weaker when it comes to improving the ability of returning victims 
to take advantage of the land and to change the conditions of exclusion 
that contributed to the original displacement and dispossession. Among 
the factors that create barriers to effective small plot farming are lack of 
access to subsidies, services, equipment, markets, and education.
314
 While 
the Ley de Victimas does establish programs for health,
315
 professional 
development,
316
 education,
317
 and housing,
318
 these programs are not 
targeted at the unique characteristics of returning victims,
319
 and they are 
not subject to adequate coordination.
320
 Additionally, returning victims are 
likely to have problems accessing at least some of the programs. For 
example, as we discussed earlier, professional development will primarily 
proceed through the National Service of Learning [―SENA‖], whose 
locations are mostly in large cities, not the rural locations to which the 
victims will generally return.
321
  
Moreover, the Ley de Victimas takes important steps to strengthen land 
rights for rural peasants. First, it provides formal titles to the restored land 
and renders it difficult to transfer for two years, providing protection 
against future coerced transfers.
322
 Second, it provides support for 
alleviating debts and taxes encumbering restoring lands
323
 by preventing 
such debts from being used to seize the land.  
The Ley de Victimas could take additional steps to ensure that the small 
plot farmers would be better able to take advantage of their restored land 
 
 
 313. Ley de Victimas arts. 114–16; cf. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 81. 
 314. See Sánchez & Uprimny, supra note 39, at 207; Berry, supra note 40, at 43, 63. 
 315. Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] arts. 52–59 
 (Colom.). 
 316. Id. arts. 130–31. 
 317. Id. art. 51. 
 318. Id. arts. 123–27. 
 319. See id. arts. 51, 52–59, 123–27, 130–31. 
 320. See supra notes 278–92 and accompanying text. 
 321. Approximately 70% of SENA‘s different locations are in cities of over 100,000 people. 
Ubicación y Horarios de Atención, SENA, http://www.sena.edu.co/Portal/El+SENA/Ubicaci%C3% 
B3n+y+horarios+de+atenci%C3%B3n/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
 322. Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 101 
 (Colom.); cf. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 72–74 (Subprogram for Clearing Property Titles) 
(establishing certain protections against dispossession by establishing clear titles to land and 
strengthening the land titling system). 
 323. Ley de Victimas arts. 112–13; cf. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 66–71 (Subprogram 
for Alleviating Debt Encumbrances) (providing assistance to ensure that public and private debts do 
not overly encumber property holdings). 
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than they were before displacement and dispossession. The Programa 
design contemplated training and advising such farmers on work-related 
issues
324
 as well as grants and financing for agricultural and productive 
projects.
325
 These initiatives would have had the potential to rectify many 
problems for small plot farmers, allowing for increased accessed to 
equipment, markets, and education. Importantly, all would have been 
specifically directed at returning victims
326
 and coordinated by a central 
body.
327
 It may be possible for the government to incorporate some of 
these programs in the final restitution process, as the Ley de Victimas 
authorizes the government to create a new policy for rural development.
328
 
Features from the Ley de Victimas as well as the defunct Programa 
design suggest that the Pinheiro Principles‘ lack of a transformative focus 
can be mitigated by secondary programs to assist returning victims, but 
only when these programs are centrally administered and locally 
accessible to victims. Indeed, a program that includes an aggressive 
supplemental land distribution program could transform land distribution 
despite the Pinheiro Principles‘ requirement that all dispossessed people 
receive restitution. Other forms of support, such as loans and training, may 
also improve returning victim‘s ability to make use of their land. Both of 
these goals, however, require centralized administration to ensure that the 
programs are accessible and are meeting their objectives of transforming 
the conditions of life of returning victims. 
IX. PAYING FOR RETURN 
A final question that faces any restitution program design is whether 
the cost of a program to resolve the IDP crisis through restitution and 
return is a wise social investment. A comprehensive design is a better 
social investment than a minimalist restitution and return program because 
a comprehensive design is more likely to leave the victims in a position 
where they will not need to rely on the state in the future.  
The Ley de Victimas is unlikely to place an excessive strain on public 
funds that will make it impossible to satisfy the claims of all the victims 
while also fulfilling other legitimate claims on state resources. The 
projected total costs for a comprehensive displacement policy has been 
 
 
 324. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 59–62. 
 325. Id. at 62–64. 
 326. See id. at 55–74. 
 327. Id. at 93. 
 328. Ley de Victimas, L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, 40.096 DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 206 
 (Colom.). 
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estimated at $44.2 trillion pesos (approximately $25 billion dollars) over 
ten years and for accompanying land policies $7.2 trillion pesos 
(approximately $4 billion dollars).
329
 The Ley de Victimas relies on 
restitution as the primary remedy for dispossession, potentially avoiding 
the cost involved in providing monetary or in-kind compensation to a 
victim of dispossession.
330
 Additionally, it reduces the costs to the state by 
covering some costs from sources other than the general budget, looking 
to public and private donations, international aid, and confiscated goods, 
among others.
331  
At the same time, the costs of restitution should not be considered a 
straightforward drain on the state budget. Restitution may facilitate 
economic growth in the long term and support development more 
generally. While restitution may have a short term negative impact on 
economic growth, the medium and long term research indicates that 
restitution can support economic growth.
332
 Pablo de Grieff claims that 
restitution programs can aid development by clarifying property rights
333
 
while Roht-Arriaza and Orlovsky list a number of ways in which 
reparations can more generally benefit development, including by 
promoting civil society development and land titling and registry 
creation.
334
  
The costs of restitution are also offset by decreasing the need for other 
state spending to protect the constitutional rights
335
 of the displaced 
population. Displacement is a major social problem closely connected to 
poverty that the Colombian government must address with public funds 
 
 
 329. SNAIPD, supra note 4, at 190.  
 330. Ley de Victimas, art. 97; cf. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 32, 46. 
 331. Ley de Victimas, art. 113; cf. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 11 (drawing funds first 
from those who directly caused the harm, then to a general fund of property turned in by demobilized 
paramilitaries, and finally to public resources to cover the costs of restitution). But see id. at 19 
(reporting that demobilizing paramilitaries have turned in fewer goods than hoped). 
 332. See Ibáñez, supra note 2, at 10 (reporting that land unexploited due to displacement will 
reduce agricultural growth by 3.5% per year and that increased wealth concentration decreases public 
investment that benefits growth). 
 333. See Pablo de Greiff, Articulating the Links Between Transitional Justice and Development: 
Justice and Social Integration, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT 28, 37 (Pablo de Greiff 
& Roger Duthie eds., 2009). 
 334. Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, A Complementary Relationship: Reparations and Development, in 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT 170, 182–89 (Pablo de Greiff & Roger Duthie eds., 
2009). 
 335. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sala Tercera de Revisión, enero 22, 
2004, Sentencia T-025, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.); Corte Constitucional 
[C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sala Segunda de Revisión, enero 26, 2009, Auto 008, Gaceta de la Corte 
Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss1/2
  
 
 
 
 
2012] THE COLOMBIAN LAND RESTITUTION EXPERIENCE  51 
 
 
 
 
regardless of whether it does so through restitution or through other 
means.
336
 Unlike stopgap measures to address the immediate humanitarian 
needs of IDPs, land restitution accompanied by return may constitute a 
durable solution to the crisis.
337
 While the problem of displacement in 
Colombia involves more than a lack of housing stability for the displaced, 
return would likely permanently improve the condition of displaced 
persons across a number of dimensions, including economic stability.
338
 It 
is likely that land restitution may render unnecessary humanitarian aid and 
other measures that would otherwise be necessary to address the needs of 
the displaced population. 
Whether restitution can decrease the need for spending on support for 
the displaced depends to a large extent on whether restitution permanently 
resolves the displacement problem, in part or in whole. However, it will 
only permanently resolve the problem if victims returning to their homes 
are able to restart lives in which they are self-sufficient and are not subject 
to further displacement. As a result, the costs of restitution will only be a 
good investment if the state provides the support that enables victims to 
become economically self-sufficient and takes adequate measures to 
prevent re-victimization. In this sense, the support programs that a 
comprehensive restitution policy creates are needed in order for restitution 
to be a worthwhile social investment. A comprehensive restitution 
program, despite its higher initial costs, is likely to be a better use of 
limited social resources in the long term. 
X. CONCLUSION 
As the case of restitution in Colombia shows, the apparent problems 
with the Pinheiro Principles are generally less severe than might be 
thought. The primary apparent problem with how the Pinheiro Principles 
constrain the design is that they preclude the restitution program from 
doing more to transform the distribution of land. However, this problem is 
 
 
 336. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sala Tercera de Revisión, enero 22, 
2004, Sentencia T-025, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.); Corte Constitucional 
[C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Sala Segunda de Revisión, enero 26, 2009, Auto 008, Gaceta de la Corte 
Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.). 
 337. ―A durable solution is achieved when former IDPs no longer have specific assistance and 
protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights 
without discrimination resulting from their displacement.‖ Rep. of the Secretary-General, supra note 
37, ¶ 8. ―A durable solution can be achieved through: Sustainable reintegration at the place of origin 
. . . Sustainable local integration in areas where internally displaced persons take refuge . . . [or] 
Sustainable integration in another part of the country . . . .‖ Id. ¶ 9. 
 338. PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13, at 47. 
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potentially surmountable by complementing land restitution with land 
grants to people who receive restitution, at least when a state has land 
available to distribute. Additionally, the individualized restitution awards 
that the Pinheiro Principles require do not create insurmountable 
administrative problems, since various institutional measures can 
coordinate awards across victims and with other social services and the 
costs of restitution can be kept under control and spread over time.  
However, to make restitution and return a successful response to 
internal displacement, the program needs to take a comprehensive 
approach, including both institutions that provide centralized 
administration and programs that support returning victims. Centralized 
administration is necessary both to provide equal access to restitution and 
to ensure adequate and consistent support for victims as they return. 
Support programs are necessary to make return an appealing choice for 
victims and to ensure that victims can restart their lives when they return, 
to facilitate the transformation of rural agriculture, and to reduce the need 
for further social spending. Without these measures, restitution is less 
likely to significantly improve the internal displacement crisis.
339
 
The Ley de Victimas land restitution design provides a useful model for 
evaluating how best to apply the Pinheiro Principles to facilitate return in 
an actual displacement crisis. It constitutes a refined strategy to address the 
IDP crisis in a nation with a more advanced IDP policy than any other 
nation.
340
 Moreover, the design has both features that appear more 
minimalist, such as the primary focus on the restoration of land titles, as 
well as those features that are more comprehensive, such as the 
underdeveloped programs to meet the needs of returning victims and to 
provide institutional coordination. Most importantly, the design broadly 
complies with the Pinheiro Principles, providing clear examples of how 
those principles can be instantiated in a restitution program design. While 
the design may deviate from the strict requirements of the Pinheiro 
 
 
 339. While the administrative and support programs in the Ley de Victimas are suboptimal, there 
are still several opportunities for improvement. First, the Constitutional Court will likely receive a 
series of constitutional challenges, providing it with the opportunity declare the Ley constitutional 
conditional on changes necessary to resolve the unconstitutional state of affairs. Second, the Ley will 
require implementing regulations to put it into effect, which could both amplify the victim support 
programs, within limits, and better delimit authority and responsibility. Third, the Ley itself requires 
the government to create a new rural development policy with prioritization for victims of the conflict. 
This could provide an excellent opportunity to strengthen the support programs for returning victims. 
 340. Colombia, IDP VOICES, http://www.internal-displacement.org/80257297004E5CC5/9B5 
3FD612B5E8D22802572980050ED0E?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). See generally 
PROGRAMA JULIO, supra note 13. 
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Principles in limited ways, these minor deviations have minimal impact on 
the assessment of the Pinheiro Principles.  
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